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The Sign, The Body and Ecriture in Roland Barthes (129 pages)
Directors: Michel Valentin '''' i 
Christopher Anderson
This study discusses the role of the figure of the body in the 
semiotic theory of Roland Barthes. The concept of the body, which 
can be discerned in Barthes' early theoretical writings, is central 
to the v.’ay in which Barthes later describes the creation of meaning 
in the reading and writing of literature.
The study begins by situating Barthes work within the framework 
of modern French literary theory. This is followed by a discussion 
of Saussurian linguistics and the concept of "positive linguistic 
value". A close reading of Writing Degree Zero reveals the 
possibility of viewing écriture not only as an ethical concept but, 
perhaps more importantly, as a linguistic concept. Similarities 
are noted between the linguistic sign of Saussure and w-hat one 
might call the "literary sign", or écriture, in Barthes. Ecriture, 
in other words, can be considered as a linguistic sign which 
competes with the Saussurian sign and which takes its place 
alongside the signs of Freud, Kristeva and Lacan in as much as it 
is subject to disturbances of af factivity. This disturbance is 
linguistically productive.
A discussion follows in which the concept of écriture is used to 
explain Barthes' peculiar position with regard to poetry. Next, 
Barthes' use and later rejection of the structuralist method is 
considered in the works On Racine, Criticism and Truth, S/Z and The 
Pleasure of the Text. It is argued that the concept of the body 
plays an important role in the development of Barthes' changing 
theoretical positions. The way in which Barthes liberates the body 
through "writing" is seen as a further com.mitment to the principle 
of écriture first mentioned in Writing Degree Zero.
The concluding chapter summarizes the central role of the body in 
Barthes' perspective in general.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction;
Roland Barthes* critical works are quite varied with 
respect to subject matter and theoretical approach. Yet, in 
all of his works there is a constant concern with language as 
a form invested with both human freedom and alienation. From 
Writing Degree Zero (1953) to Camera Lucida (1980) Barthes' 
analyses and his use of language show a deep fascination for 
this peculiarly human form --for its powers in containing and 
directing thought and in its agency in structuring human 
activities. In particular his essentially structuralist view 
of (what we call) natural language and its "analogues" has led 
him through various conceptions of the literary object and the 
nature and functions of literary criticism.
Barthes' early concern with the formal properties of 
language and literature led him to postulate, in Writ inq 
Degree Zero, a history of "modes of writing" whose political 
engagement could be identified by their form (on the side of 
the signifier) rather than solely by their content (within the 
signifieds). In other words, works by Camus or Quenneau, for 
example, could be said to be politically engaged without ever 
overtly raising political issues within their content.
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This same work presented the public with Barthes' concept 
of écriture which is the focal point of my study. Much has 
been made of the "ethical" aspect of écriture in connection 
with the historical analysis offered in Writing Degree Zero. 
Little has been said, however, of the endurance of the 
linguistic foundation of this concept or of its development in 
Barthes' later work. I will argue that the linguistic nature 
of Barthes' argument in Writing Degree Zero has not been fully 
recognized by commentators and critics of his work. I will 
show that despite the fact that Barthes did not read Saussure 
until 1957 there was nonetheless a good deal of Saussurian 
(structural) thought behind his formulation of the concept of 
écriture.
By stressing the linguistic rather than the ethical 
aspect of écriture I will show how this concept constantly 
fascinates Barthesian theory which is ever concerned with what 
Kristeva calls the "borders of language". Ecriture is, in a 
metaphorical sense, a geographical concern with language and 
its boundaries. It is concerned with sign systems within 
language — their possible configurations, their meeting 
places, their gaps and divergences.
Barthes' formalist concerns, combined with his Marxist 
philosophy, led him early in his career to examine the 
influence of ideology on language. This examination, first 
suggested in Writing Degree Eero, led to his linguistic 
analysis of the phenomena of "myth" in the second edition of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Mythologies (1957). Myth is the "stealing" or impregnation of 
language by ideology — another language. Ideology, Barthes 
argued in "Myth Today" (1957), is able to deform the arbitrary 
relationship which exists between the elements of a linguistic 
sign by virtue of the confusion which can result between the 
meaning of the sign and an ideological concept. In "mythic" 
communication the linguistic sign functions as a partial sign- 
- as a mere signifier — for the larger ideological sign. 
Below, I have represented a modified schema of the mythic 
language which Barthes describes in Mythologies (115).
Language-
Obj ect
MYTH
1. Signifier 2. Signified
3 . Meaning/
I FORM II CONCEPT
(signifier) (signif ied)
III SIGNIFICATION 
(sign)
Myth easily functions within language because the 
arbitrary relationship between the elements of the sign (at 
the language-object level) does not permit a foreclosure of 
meaning. This is what distinguishes a language from a 
nomenclature. In other words, denotation does not exhaust the 
language sign’s power to signify. Signs resonate meaning 
through their connotative and associative powers — and much of 
Barthes' structuralism aims at explaining the "system" of 
these connoted associations which are largely driven by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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metaphor and metonymy. In the case of myth, however, the 
original meaning of the sign is displaced. It remains only as 
an "alibi" for the ideological concept which now functions as 
the dominant signified of its host language.
What Barthes finds objectionable in myth is not 
uncontrolled signification, but that fact that the ideological 
signified passes itself off as the "natural" signified of the 
first-order linguistic sign. Ideology has the look of the 
first, object-level language. It takes the "naturalness" of 
the first order language as a cover for its ideological 
communication. (I shall discuss the illusion of "naturalness" 
below in treating Saussure's sign theory.) The added 
superstructure which is schematically described above is never 
announced in mythic language. It functions covertly. It can 
do this because of a logical affinity which exists between the 
ideological concept and the original meaning of the sign. It 
is here that there is a motivated relation between signifier 
(the first-order sign) and signified. The concept and the 
meaning are put into a whirlwind spin, like a top, whose 
blurred image does not disclose its dual nature.
This process, which fascinated Barthes during the writing 
of Mythologies, The Fashion System and Elements of Semiology 
largely informs his understanding of the poetic ("polysémie") 
power of language. This schema allows him to express in 
linguistic terms what he had expressed prosaically in Writing 
Degree Zero and the first edition of Mythologies : that is, how
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
literature always comes to signify something other than its 
narrative content; how it signifies and serves conservative 
interests of bourgeois culture.
In The Fashion System Barthes schematized the contrast 
between connotation (which is basically the system described 
above) to that of meta-language. The difference between the 
two is that, whereas myth enslaves another language's sign and 
uses it clandestinely as a signifier, as a form, for its own 
signifieds, meta-language treats the sign of the object- 
language as its signified. It openly tries to pick up this 
sign-as-signified in order to explore it within the logic of 
its relations. A meta-language does not hide itself as does 
mythic language. Barthes contrasts the way in which these 
languages can take root in object-languages in The Fashion 
System. I have reproduced his schématisation below with a few 
modifications :
rits L. a
Language signifier Sign/(signified)
Object- Signified Signified
Language
Myth/con­
notation
Sign/ (signifier)
Signifier Signified
signified
Object- 
Language
In myth, as we have already seen, the sign of the object- 
language functions as the signifier for the second language
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(the ideological communication). In meta-language the sign of 
the object-language functions as the signified of the second 
language. In myth something alien is at work within a host 
system. In meta-language the object is simply to understand 
the structure of the host system. A distance is needed in 
order to evoke this system — a distance which can only be 
supplied by another, meta-, language.
Both of these languages have their origins in semio- 
sociological studies which focus upon the sign's ability to 
exceed denotative expression and to function in other language 
systems. Myth exploits the indeterminacy of the sign, whereas 
me ta-language tries to limit this indeterminacy, to "pin it 
down", so to speak. A casual reading of Mythologies might 
lead one to think that Barthes prefers meta-language to 
mythical language; but the situation is not so clear. In 
chapter three I shall discuss the problem which Barthes has 
with structural interpretation, especially the way in which it 
"pins down" and closes literary signifieds. In short, Barthes 
admires the "mythic" power of language. He is deeply 
fascinated by it. For him it is the seat of the pleasure of 
the word. That which he dislikes in "myth" is simply the way 
in which it serves ideological means. And when he finds that 
semiology is not enough to weaken the power of myth he resorts 
to what he calls "semio-clasm" , or the breaking of signs. How 
does this activity relate to that of the structuralist? What 
does it entail? These are questions which I shall treat in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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subsequent chapters, especially when considering the role of 
the body in Barthes' sign theory.
Connotation and meta-language are soon employed in 
Barthes' literary analyses. Connotation is the phenomenon 
which, for Barthes, generally accounts for the poetic and 
"polysémie" nature of literary language. Meta-languages, like 
those employed by the literary critic aim at an explanation of 
the power of the literary sign, and attempt to assign a 
unified structure of meaning to these signs.
With Barthes' interest in meta-language one can see that 
his treatment of the sign evolves. It is becoming 
increasingly scientific and responsive to calls for 
responsibility in the interpretation of texts. The radical 
form of writing which he named écriture continually escapes or 
is ignored by his systematic theories, and he eventually 
breaks from the structuralist model of literary criticism 
largely for this reason. In 1971 he approaches the literary 
work from another point of view. With S/Z Barthes abandons 
the search for any unified content structuring the work in 
favor of a focus upon the interplay between the "codes" of the 
text. He abandons the conception of the literary object as a 
"work" — a conception which always favors a closure of 
meaning—  in favor of a conception of the open, social 
"texturing" of the literary text. In so doing Barthes 
explodes the object of structuralist study. I will show how 
this change in position is consistent with his original
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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concept of the sign which surprisingly few commentators have 
noticed in Writing Decree Zero. It is a conception which is 
visibly operative just at the surface of Writing Degree Zero.
With all of these changes'in his critical project Barthes 
nevertheless returns to the use of familiar linguistic 
terminology to explain his views to his reader. His
positions constantly evolve. One commentator has argued 
persuasively that Barthes is ultimately more interested in the 
idiosyncracies of strategies and of methods and what they 
produce, than in ever trying to produce a coherent and unified 
theory of the literary object or of writing. The more one 
comes to understand Barthes the less surprising this becomes. 
In fact, it is what seems of most value in his work. His work 
is like so many paths leading to different horizons. They are 
all tempting. They all offer a certain promise. but, it is 
not immediately clear how they relate to each other; how they 
might converge at a central point, in the person of Barthes 
himself. It is for this reason that I choose to study his 
work from the point of view of the linguistic sign. Barthes 
repeatedly returns to the linguistic sign as a model for 
explanation. It comes to function as lingua franca. His 
concern for the "health" of languages, for écriture, can only 
be understood from a linguistic point of view, from an 
understanding of the essential elements of the sign.
The sign is also a central linguistic concept which 
provides a ready relay to other concepts of importance in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
Barthes' structuralist work. I believe, however, that there 
are two different conceptions of the sign in Barthes. And if 
I am correct in this, the debate over Barthes evolution, 
whether or not his later work is a continuation or rejection 
of his structuralist period, may become clearer.
Barthes had a conception of the Sausurrian sign which he 
got from discussions with Greimas while convalescing from an 
early illness. I believe his understanding' of this sign to 
have been highly idiosyncratic, and for that reason, deeply 
rooted in Barthes' personal "logos".
His original formulation of the sign, generally 
unrecognized by other critics, had, I believe, a formative 
influence on his later, post-structuralist thought. In this 
regard Barthes' work forms a circle — in that he returns and 
develops ideas dear to him at the time of the writing of 
Writing Degree Zero. In my estimation Barthes' structuralist 
period — which he refers to as his "heroic" period—  is the 
period where he was most involved with ideas that were not his 
own. He was exploring by synthesizing the ideas of others, 
rather than developing his own. In this regard the concept of 
the sign at use in Barthesian thought can be used as a vehicle 
to unify (at least thematically within a linguistic 
perspective) what has been thought of as unrelated elements in 
Barthes* work. Barthes never abandons the concept of the sign 
even though he supposedly renounces semiology and abandons
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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structuralism for a new approach which focuses on the reader's 
(textual) pleasure.
Because so much of Barthes’ earlier scientificity is 
linguistically based, and because the structural aspect of 
modern linguistics is at times misunderstood, misrepresented 
or artificially delimited in its application by linguists and 
critics alike, it will be useful to review some of the central 
tenets of Saussure's Course in General Linguistics. I will 
present the basic concepts necessary to an understanding of 
structural linguistics as put forward by Saussure. These 
concepts are, in the main, accepted without significant change 
in Barthes' work; however, some important differences between 
the two men will be discerned.
SOME KEY CONCEPTS IN SIGN THEORY: ORIGINS IN SAUSSURE.
The sign, the signifier and the signified:
What is language? Saussure finds in language a system of 
"pure values" (24) which is made of the marriage of organized 
thought coupled with organized sound. Language is a field 
where abstract and amorphous thought and sound are brought 
together, fragmented, and unified through a system into signs. 
This combination of sound and thought creates a form, not a 
substance— a distinction stressed by Saussure.̂ The exact 
origin of language is impossible to determine, however it 
seems reasonable to suggest that the plastic, divisible nature
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of sound provides thought with its signifiers. The role of 
language is not to create material for expressing ideas, but 
to serve as a "link between thought and sound, under 
conditions that of necessity bring about the reciprocal 
delimitations of units"(112).
Psychologically our thought— apart from 
its expression in words— is only a 
shapeless and indistinct mass. 
Philosophers and linguists have always 
agreed in recognizing that without the 
help of signs we would be unable to make 
a clear-cut, consistent distinction 
between two ideas. Without language, 
thought is a vague, uncharted nebula.
There are no pre-existing ideas, and 
nothing is distinct before the appearance 
of language (111-112),
This point of view echoes that of Rousseau who states in 
his Discours sur 1'inégalité and his Essai sur 1'origine des 
langues , that man's "state of nature" was pre-linguistic. Man 
was incapable of any conceptualization without language. 
Rousseau indicates that he understands the intricate relation 
between language and thought, where he states that language 
and conceptualization give rise to each other. One is not 
possible without the other.^
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Saussure states that we often do not think about the 
nature of language; that we take it for granted, and that when 
we do think of it, we tend to see it as a system of 
nomenclature. This is the common sense view of language.
Because things (or ideas) have names, we tend to think that 
words point to things and that this is the function of the 
word. This view makes the word the representative for the 
thing named, i.e., the referent. The referent becomes the 
content of the word. But this supposition is false, argues 
Saussure, because it presupposes the existence of all things 
for which we have names. It presupposes, for example the 
existence or, rather, the pre-existence of ideas before
language. Saussure sees this as an overly-simplified view of 
language (97-98).
Arguing against the nomenclature view, Saussure states 
that such a perspective sheds no light as to whether a word is 
to be viewed as a vocal or as a psychological entity, when it 
is, in fact, both (98). For Saussure, a linguistic "unit" is
a two-dimensional thing: it has two terms both of which are
psychological. (Neither of which is the referent.) The 
linguistic sign does not unify a thing and a word. Rather it 
is the unity of a concept and an acoustic image which is also 
mental. This image, Saussure states,
is not the material sound, a purely 
physical thing, but the psychological 
imprint of the sound, the impression that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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it makes on our senses. The sound-image 
IS sensory, and if I happen to call it 
"material," it is only in that sense, and
by way of opposing it to the other term
of the association, the concept which is 
generally more abstract (66).
The psychological nature of acoustic images is evident,
Saussure says, when we consider that we can "hear" a voice
when we talk to ourselves mentally, or when we recite verse 
without opening our mouths or moving even our tongues.
The linguistic sign, then, is a binary entity both sides 
of which are psychological. It is for this reason that 
Saussure uses the term sound-image, which is mental, instead 
of sound in describing the elements proper to language. A 
language need not be based on sound.
This conception of the sign is difficult to grasp because 
we are in the habit of viewing the linguistic unit, the word 
(the sign) as if it were only a "sound-image" whose function 
is to represent something outside of language. But, this is 
not the case, stresses Saussure, who laments the fact that the 
word "sign" is somewhat unclear:
I call the combination of a concept and a 
sound-image a sign, but in current usage 
the term generally designates only a 
sound-image, a word, for example (arbor, 
etc.). One tends to forget that arbor is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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called a sign only because it carries the 
concept "tree," with the result that the 
idea of the sensory part implies the idea 
of the whole {67 ) .
In other words, the word — which we too easily mistake to be 
the representative for the thing, the referent—  is in fact a 
binary element of language, already containing a concept which 
corresponds to the referent (supposedly outside of language). 
Saussure insists upon the double nature of the sign. It is 
not enough to say that the word represents the concept: this
would be to fall back into the nomenclature circle. The 
"word" is already a complete sign. To avoid this potential 
misunderstanding he gives to each element of the sign its own 
appellation. The acoustic-image he calls the signifier, the 
concept he calls the signified.
Is the sign, then, simply the union of a certain sound 
and a certain concept? Not exactly, says Saussure, because 
such a conception of the sign does not consider the sign 
within its system. It gives the impression that meaning is 
given only by the signified; that it is the positive 
anatomical content of the sign. Such a view encourages the 
idea that one can create meaning by simply adding signs 
together to determine a meaning— the way a classical French 
critic might add historical-biographical material together to 
produce a truth on Racine. But this is not the case, for as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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we shall see below, the content of the sign is determined 
differentially within a system of signs.
The Arbitrary Nature of the "Sign":
Saussure explains that the relation between the two 
elements of the sign is completely arbitrary, i.e., there is 
no logical necessity which relates the one to the other. That 
is to say a given signified could have been conjoined with any 
other signifier to form a sign. This view is supported by 
comparing signs between languages. The concept "chair" has 
the signifiers "stol" in Norwegian, "chaise" in French, and 
"silla" in Spanish. There is nothing in the shape of the 
signifier "chair" (in any of these languages) to determine its 
relation to the signified (the idea of) chair. Signifiers, 
then, are different from symbols which have a "motivated" 
(natural or analogical) relationship to their signifieds. 
Saussure makes this clear stating that the signifier for the 
signified "justice", which is a blindfolded woman holding a 
scale, could not be equally well symbolized by a chariot, for 
example (68 ) .
That the linguistic sign is partly composed of sound, or 
sound-images means that the signifier (the sound-image) is 
qualified by its temporality. It is "unfolded" in time. 
Human language depends upon this unfolding, as do such art 
forms as poetry, narrations, music. The elements of language
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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are presented in a succession. Signifiers are grouped 
linearly to form "chains" of signification (70).
Difference. The creation of positive value:
Value is one of the most important of the Saussurian 
concepts bequeathed to structural linguistics. Rather than 
focusing on the atomic meaning of sound units in the language- 
-be they conceived as words or signs—  Saussure speaks of a 
value, related to signification, which is delimited by the 
sign’s "competition" with other signs. The key to value is 
negative difference within the two substances of language 
considered independently, i.e., sound and thought. The sign, 
as we shall see, has positive value, only when viewed in its 
totality — as the union of signifier and signified and as a 
segment informed by language as a system (122).
For Saussure, meaning (signification) is probably less 
important than value not only because the former is dependent 
upon the latter, but because meaning (signification) parades 
itself as the independent content of signs.
The fact that a signifier evokes a concept (and vice 
versa) is one aspect of value. However, to confuse value with 
signification is to miss the truly structural aspect of 
language; it is, again, to revert to the idea of language as 
a nomenclature. Both conceptual value (at the level of the 
signified) and material value (level of the signifier) are 
produced only through the simultaneous presence of related
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terms in the language. If one considers signification as the 
vertical relationship between the signifier and its signified 
then value (which encompasses this relation) is the addition 
of the sign's horizontal relationship with other signs in the 
language.
Whether considered materially or conceptually a sign 
offers the possibility of a comparison and an exchange (115), 
Exchange is the value of the relationship of the two different 
elements within the sign. As a dollar is worth, say, a pint 
of beer, a certain signifier is "worth" a certain signified 
and vice versa. However, a dollar can be compared to its own 
kind, that is other elements of currency — so that one dollar 
can be compared to two quarters, etc. (A dollar is, of 
course, worth four quarters; but comparison does not require 
equivalence; only a meaningful similarity.) Hence, we can 
compare either of the two elements of the sign with their own 
kind, i.e., signifieds with other signifieds, or signifiers 
with other signifiers. In so doing what is noticed is that 
the value of a sign cannot be fixed by isolating only its 
exchange value because the value of the sign is fixed as well 
by the concurrence of everything that exists outside it. This 
is why Saussure says that "all definitions of words are made 
in vain" (14).
Exchange value reveals the paradoxical nature of value 
(115). This becomes evident, Saussure argues, when we notice 
that words used to express related ideas delimit each other
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reciprocally. As an example Saussure gives us the paradigm 
"redouter" (to dread) "avoir peur" (to fear) and "craindre" 
(to be afraid). If "redouter" did not exist in the language, 
he says, its content would go to the other terms within the 
paradigm. A signifier can support a plurality of signifieds. 
In this way Barthes argues that a text can support a plurality 
of readings.
From the point of view of value, concepts are themselves 
purely differential, defined not by their positive content but 
negatively with respect to other terms within the system 
(paradigm). Material value is determined in essentially the 
same way. It is the product of phonic difference. This 
difference, always within a system where sound and thought are 
brought together in language, carries signification. A phonic 
segment of a language can only have value by its non­
coincidence with the rest of the language. Saussure reminds 
us that the sound in and of itself has no positive value in 
the same way that the value of a coin is not determined by its 
metal content. Value, then, is possible only through
oppositions and differences within an environment, i.e. a 
system or paradigm (117). This is why words which are talcen 
to be equivalent in two different languages are ultimately 
not truly equivalent. They have a different shape, semantic 
load, and range. Or, put another way, their performance in 
the language is restricted in dissimilar ways. Saussure's 
example of this is the words "mouton" and "sheep". They do
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not have the same value in their respective languages. 
"Mouton" can signify an animal and a meat. We, on the other 
hand do not eat "sheep"; we eat "mutton". Because of this, 
one can argue that a dictionary entry is ultimately not 
equivalent to its definition. Saussure's conception of
value also argues against the notion of pre-existing concepts 
to which signifiers give form. If there were such a p r i o n 
concepts, we would find that the terms of different languages 
would have the same value. In other words, the systemic 
nature of the environment which sustains signs influences the 
very content of those signs. To isolate a sign, to cut it up 
and spread it out is not to grasp its essence. It must be 
seen to function within a system of opposition (within a 
paradigm) which operates moreover, within the over-arching 
structure of language. "Proof of this," says Saussure, "is 
that the value of a term may be modified without either its 
meaning or its sound being affected, solely because a 
neighboring term has been modified" (120). Saussure stresses 
the important role of the system in the determination of value 
where he states:
A linguistic system is a series of 
differences of sound combined with a 
series of differences of ideas; ... and 
this system serves as the effective link 
between the phonic and psychological
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elements within each sign (120, my 
emphasis).
A language, then, is a structured economy of interrelated 
values which can only be determined through comparison and 
exchange of its material (phonic) and conceptual (ideal) 
elements. Either side of a language taken separately reveals 
only negative values. The two purely negative values of 
signifier and signified form a positive value through their 
union within a system.
Now it appears that the nature of the system has 
considerable importance as to the positive value contained by 
its elements. It is not enough to try to determine the value 
or meaning of an element without considering its systematic 
importance. It is only by viewing language as a system that 
the linguist can fully appreciate the significance of one of 
Its terms. Or, as Saussure puts it: "it would seem that it is 
the viewpoint that creates the object" (8).
Before moving on to the first of Barthes' published works 
let me briefly consider two concepts which pertain to this 
system: those of language (langue) and speech (parole).
Langue/Parole :
Language and speech, since Saussure, are no longer 
confused with each other.
Speech is an act, the product of the individual's will. 
Saussure says that it is heterogenous, and by this he means 
that one cannot consider it from a single point of view
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because "it straddles several areas simultaneously— physical, 
physiological, and psychological" (9). Moreover, it belongs 
both to the individual and to the society as a whole. 
Furthermore, speech is made up of the more or less accidental 
combination of signs, the stops and starts and repetitions 
which the individual employs in the speech act. Speech, then, 
is a complex, willful, intellectual activity which takes place 
within the moment. Determining the full content of any speech 
act is probably impossible. Saussure adds that speech
precedes language, logically, since language is built up, as 
it were by the deposition of all speech acts within a 
community (18).
Language, on the other hand, is the encompassing
systematic blue-print for all speech within a community. "It 
is a system of signs in which the only essential thing is the 
union of meanings and sound-images, and in which both parts of
the sign are psychological" (15). It is the product of the
faculty of speech— a "sedimentation"— which, in dialectical 
fashion, makes such speech possible. Unlike speech, however, 
which can be divided into heterogenous aspects, language is 
homogenous, unified, an entity unto itself. It is a faculty 
which each member of the community possesses. However, it 
does not exist perfectly in any single individual because it 
is the product of the greater community, and thus outside of 
the individual who cannot create it or modify it himself (14- 
15 ) .
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It is not difficult to see how this distinction can be 
conceptually fruitful. Nor is it difficult to imagine how the 
distinction might travel to another field to be applied 
analogically. Any concrete linguistic phenomenon can be 
considered as the product of an engendering system. A poem or 
a modern novel, for instance, could be considered as a system 
unto itself, sustaining its own relations of coherence without 
any outside reference. One could, in other words,
theoretically grant the status of langue in turn to
"Literature", or a group of literary works, or a single work—  
as long as one shows that at each level a unique "system" of 
internal relations is identifiable. These relations then must 
be reflected at another level of "language". By granting such 
status to a work, one renounces the idea that the work is a 
message — that it carries a determined content. Langue is not 
communication; it is what makes communication possible. My
reading of Barthes' work leads me to suggest that he follows 
exactly this progression. In W r iting Degree Zero he speaks of 
literature as its own language with each work being an
instance. On Racine is the structural analysis of eleven of
Racine’s tragedies, the search for Racine's langue. Each play 
taken separately is an instance of parole. In breaking with 
this approach S/Z is the study of the "plurality" of a single 
work. Barthes shows that many readings (parole) are possible
within a single text. With A Lover ' s D iscourse and other
later works, Barthes goes so far as to eventually renounce the
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meta-linguistic approach to criticism (a parole) in favor of 
a criticism which is at the same time its own aesthetic 
object.
What might parole be, if we push the analogy further? It 
would be a temporalization— an act within this language. It 
would be, in a word, a willful act of signification (or 
communication). It would be like a critic selecting a reading 
of, and giving a meaning to a work. Is "meaning" too strong? 
Speech, after all, is used for communication — the selection 
and determination of sign values. A language, taken as a 
homogenous whole, does not signify. There is no reason to 
impose meaning on the system. What does French mean? Meaning 
comes out of it— in speech. Or maybe the critic respects the 
work as a language-subject. Barthes refers to literary works 
as instances of institutionalized subjectivity. The work is 
a subject, a freedom, which defies definition. A "being" of 
literature, it is still alive. What does the critic produce, 
then, if not a paraphrase? What is his language compared to 
that of the work? It is a meta-language built upon a signified 
which imposes a meaning upon the original work. Being (most 
probably) artless, it falls away, like a speech act. Maybe 
the critic should view the work not as an object to be 
described or defined, but as a "pre-text", a textuality, a 
sanctioned point of departure for a socially engaged discourse 
focusing on contemporary questions.
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The above is intended only as a sketch of what the 
langue/parole distinction might inspire when one looks at 
signifying phenomena from a structural point of view. 
Barthes' Criticism and Truth addresses these possibilities, 
and others, but only after making room for innovative 
discourse based on the literary text. First, he must displace 
the monolithic historical-biographical single reading of the 
text which dominated French criticism, as will be seen later.
An analysis of the linguistic elements to be found in 
Writing Degree Zero require a brief summary of the radical 
nature of Saussure's conception of language. In language, 
everything is representation. Referents, sounds, concepts, 
all that we are apt to consider material of some kind is, in 
the sign, given psychological representation. Even a word has 
a representative "shape" in the mind, and this is what is left 
when the physiological (enunciatory) and phonological aspect 
of the signifier falls away. All is representation within a 
system of signification. This system, Saussure makes clear, 
creates its objects. This system is language. Its units 
function within an "economy"; their value is determined by 
mutual delimitations within a sub-environment within the 
language. This environment is the paradigm of related and, 
thus, competing terms. Still, no positive value is
discernable within the two elements of the sign until the sign 
IS considered in its totality, that is, when it is put into 
play, when it functions within the language. Positive value
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
is a linguistic and social fact in Saussure. It is not 
created, but only used by the individual according to a social 
convention. In other words, speech uses the positive value of 
signs— of which Barthes will try to show there is a surplus 
which is rooted in the expressive body — a positivity which is 
a function, of a specific deviant language use. It is not a 
function of all speech. Thus, to consider the above analogy 
once more, the positive value recognized within any given 
segment (or sign) of the poem is "framed" by its participation 
in the whole homogenous surface, the texture of the poem 
itself. There is no "fixed" meaning of a sign other than its 
difference. One must consider the system in which it 
operates, and express one's self within this system, by its 
rules of relations, in order to determine the content of a 
sign. All of this follows from the langue/parole distinction 
as it is applied to the example of the poem.
It is clear that this approach gives considerable weight 
to the immanent structures of language. "Truth" is replaced 
by "validity" as the object of critical investigation. If it 
is language which sanctions speech, and not something which 
lies outside of language, then critical discourse would not 
have to rely on the authority of the author or on a critic's 
historical positivist quest into the author's biography. 
Language is its own frontier. But, what exists outside of 
language? I am not speaking here of the "referent", which, 
for language exists only as something which has already been
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incorporated into language. What could be said of the outer 
surface, the "outside" of language? Here we must turn to 
Barthes' first major publication, enigmatically titled Writing 
Degree Zero. I will emphasize the linguistic aspect of this 
work, which I feel, has been neglected at the expense of the 
ethical argument which it contains. This argument, in any 
case, is strengthened once the linguistic supports which 
Barthes uses are better understood.
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END NOTES
1. Saussure 113. This statement is repeated twice in Course ; 
the second time Saussure repeats it (122) he lays the failures of 
linguistics up to the present time on the linguist's insistence 
upon viewing linguistic phenomena as substance — as though the 
content of a sign were fixed. Such a view, he feels, is incapable 
of recognizing the systematic nature of language.
2. Discours sur 1'inégalité (III, 129). Rousseau’s argument 
is that "amour de soi" gives rise to "amour propre" by which the 
individual spontaneously prefers himself to others. This gives 
rise in turn to an appreciation of differences, particularly the 
ordering into binary oppositions and the development of hierarchy 
which encourages the repression of one term over another through 
preference.
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CHAPTER 2 
The sign, the body, and écriture.
Writing Degree Zero, is Barthes' presentation of a new 
concept which informs a new Marxist reading of the history of 
literature, and which gives a critical appreciation of the 
nature of avant-garde writing. Barthes presents literature as 
a self-reflexive object — an object having its own 
subjectivity so to speak-- which has become increasingly aware 
of its historical position, and which is concerned with its 
own justification vis-à-vis the class which consumes it. 
Barthes traces the history of this self-consciousness and its 
relation to History proper, stating, in effect, that the 
formal "signs" of literature reflect literature's relation to 
man and to History. Such signs, in other words, are not 
merely ornamental. They are not empty. Answering Sartre's 
call for "engagement," Barthes declares that even before the 
writer begins, he is faced with the difficult choice of having 
to choose between various modes of writing. He must choose 
his form. He must define his position with respect to these 
"signs". This choice of form is in itself an engagement 
because it is made in the face of all literary writing, which, 
owing to its relation to the classes which consume it, cannot 
be considered a naive social form. The choice of form, then.
28
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is an ethical choice, no less so than the Sartrian choice of 
content .̂
All of this depends, of course, on the political nature 
of "form" as Barthes defines it. In fact, he does not choose 
the word "form" to discuss the formal aspects of an author's 
writing. This word is too easily confused with genre, and it 
naturally leads to the "form" versus "content" binarism. 
Instead Barthes chooses the term écriture --the French word 
for "writing" which has usually been translated into English 
as "modes of writing". In either language the concept looming 
behind the word is somewhat difficult to grasp for two 
reasons: the term chosen is already semantically filled by
the ideas of "writing" and "penmanship", and Barthes uses the 
term écriture somewhat ambiguously to mean two different 
things, neither of which are directly related to the ideas of 
"writing" or "penmanship". {If the pen is stronger than the 
sword "penmanship" — as opposed to "swordsmanship"—  would not 
have made, in fact, such a bad candidate for what Barthes 
suggests by écriture).
In Barthes, écriture is a special kind of writing and yet 
it can also be just a "mode of writing". Almost all 
commentators, with the exception of Blanchot (as noted by 
Lavers), have missed the specifically linguistic aspect of 
this concept in Writing Degree Zero. Vincent Jouve, for 
example, in his excellent analysis of Barthes' literary theory 
says that the écriture which functions in Barthesian theory in
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1972 "hardly has any relation with the concept of the same 
name in Dégré Zéro." (La Littérature Selon Barthes p. 34). 
Commentators like Jouve are surprised to see écriture used 
some twenty years after WDZ in a different way --in a way more 
closely associated with "excess" in language — which is to say 
that they have missed something important about the role of 
"excess" in Barthes' argument for a new ethical history of the 
forms of literature. They do not see the genetic relationship 
between Barthes' somewhat unusual concept of "style" (its 
relation to the body) which is the source both of "excess" and 
of new language on the one hand, and the ethical aspect of 
écriture which is all too familiar today. The ethical reading 
of Degree Zero dominates to the extent that commentators view 
it as a direct response to Sartre's O u 'est-ce que la 
littérature?. They mistakenly assume that Barthes is 
responding in kind to Sartre's argument for an engaged 
literature — by which Sartre meant only engaged prose. 
Barthes and Sartre, however, do not share the same fundamental 
conception of language.
Barthes himself is responsible for this confusion which 
his everyday term écriture produces. He could have chosen a 
term having more to do with "modes of writing" than simply the 
French word for "writing", and he could have used a another 
term to describe the specifically novel character of new 
language which is also indicated by the term écriture. But, 
on the other hand, the confusion which results from his
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deformation of the original sense of écriture is exactly the 
kind of result which defines overly determined signs caught up 
in the phenomenon of écriture. But, because this novel 
aspect is just a moment in the life of a form which soon 
becomes a "mode of writing", it is possible that Barthes did 
not see the need to split his concept into terms representing 
these two moments. However, because an understanding of these 
two moments is important if one is to appreciate the 
continuity of Barthesian thought, I will not consistently 
translate "écriture" into "writing" or "modes of writing" as 
has usually been done by Colin Smith, Susan Sontag, Stephen 
Heath and others. My reason for this is twofold. As an alien 
term for the English reader— a new signifier—  écriture offers 
the possibility of denoting a specific meaning which is 
somewhat antithetical to what is suggested by "mode of 
writing". That meaning can best be expressed in English, I 
feel, by leaving the term in French. By "écriture" I mean to 
isolate the freshness and "innocence" of a "mode of writing" - 
-or, what amounts to the same thing in Barthes, simply a new 
configuration of language produced by invention and deviation. 
What follows in this chapter, then, is an argument for the 
essentially linguistic aspect of Barthes' concept of écriture 
found in Writing Degree Zero. I will support my reading of 
the linguistic nature of this concept with numerous citations 
from Barthes' history of literature and the analysis of its 
forms presented in Writing Degree Zero. In so doing, I will
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show that these arguments have their full force only if one 
accepts the linguistic aspect of écriture.
Barthes' presents his concept of écriture in the 
introduction to Degree Zero and in the chapter entitled "What 
is Writing?". He gives as an example the writing of the 
revolutionary pamphleteer, Jaques Hébert (1757-1794), who 
always began each issue of his newspaper with an exhilarating 
string of obscenities. These obscenities, says Barthes, meant 
something, though they could never signify anything specific 
to anyone other than Hébert himself. It would be impossible 
to render the exact meaning of Hébert's expression. And yet 
these expletives expressed something quite important --the 
revolutionary feeling of the day. In Hébert's writing, 
Barthes says, we find
an example of a model of writing whose 
function is no longer only communication 
or expression, but the imposition of 
something beyond language, which is both 
History and the stand we take in it (WDZ
p. 1) .
What interests me here is not simply the idea that one 
may take an ethical stand by virtue of the form of language 
used, but that, for Barthes, there is something which an 
individual can impose beyond the boundary of language even 
while using this language. There are gaps in the prison walls 
of language.
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One can easily recognize that there is a use for language 
which is not necessarily dependant upon the determined meaning 
of words. Words, by their Indeterminacy, can signify much 
more than their dictionary content. But, Barthes is saying 
more than this. One can use language in such a way as to go 
beyond the boundaries of language — which is to say, beyond 
the boundaries of constituted thought in language. This going 
beyond the boundary is a uniquely individual act for Barthes, 
one by which an author makes his mark, takes his stand, and 
reveals his style. Ecriture, then, is a very loaded concept 
having little to do with the everyday uses of the word 
"writing".
Barthes gives us the anatomy of écriture in Writing 
Degree Zero, saying that it is the product of the mixture of 
both the individual's style and language. To understand 
écriture then, we must examine more closely what Barthes has 
in mind when he uses these terms. Like écriture they are not 
used in their every day sense. In my examination of these 
concepts I will make several references to Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty, especially his work The Phenomenology of Perception 
(1945). The difficulty in grasping some of what Barthes says 
about language and style can be alleviated by Merleau-Ponty's 
discussion of these terms. Also, it seems likely that the 
French phenomenologist had an influence upon Barthes' 
conception of écriture, which is unquestionably the foundation 
of his argument in Writing Degree Zero. He mentions Merleau-
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Pont y by name only for the first time in 1964 in his work 
Elements of Semiology, but notably in conjunction with that of 
the linguist Brondal from whom he obtained the concept of 
écriture blanche or "neutral writing" which is a prototypical 
concept for Barthes' writing at the "zero degree". I believe 
the juxtaposition of these two thinkers at this later period 
indicates an earlier influence on Barthes by Merleau-Ponty.
Language :
Barthes has written in the introduction to Mythologies 
that he did not read Saussure's Course in General Linguistics 
until 1957. I will argue that Barthes' concept of language in 
1953 is already structural --that it is the same conception, 
or nearly so, that we find in Saussure, but with one important 
difference: écriture. This concept implies a dynamic
relationship between the individual subject and language which 
is found neither in Saussure nor later in Lacan.
Barthes conception of language clearly incorporates a 
langue/parole kind of distinction. However, unlike Saussure 
Barthes does not oppose langue to parole in a binary fashion 
in Writing Degree Zero. Rather, he opposes the concept of 
language to that of style as on opposition between two 
languages. And it is this concept of style which may be in 
the end the most personally innovative, informative and 
enduring in Barthesian thought.
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In the chapter, "What is Writing", Barthes' opening line 
would put the structuralist reader on familiar ground: "We
know that a language is a corpus of prescriptions and habits 
common to all the writers of a period" (9). Here language is 
less the common substance belonging to a nation of speakers 
than a body of rules under which writers labor. "Language" in 
this instance appears to be writer specific. It is the 
artist's language, the language of Literature, which has its 
rules and prescriptions delimiting the scope of Literature. 
It is, in effect, not just the rules of the mother language, 
but the rules governing the "signs" of literature. Therefore, 
it IS sometimes necessary to distinguish between two levels of 
language in Barthes. What he refers to as language, in other 
words, is not necessarily the mother tongue, the "master" 
language of the larger community. Rather, it is any body of 
signs which function within a closed system.^ Barthes' view 
is that one can have a language within a language, i.e., the 
language of Literature within the French language.
There has been some discussion among linguists whether or 
not language is a closed system, that is, whether or not the 
individual can effect any changes upon the structure of 
language. With his concept of écriture Barthes takes a 
position in the debate. For him, language is almost 
completely closed but not totally. Ecriture, the going beyond 
language, and the flexibility of language which this implies, 
is always possible. Speaking of political modes of writing,
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Barthes refers to them as "closed" and as "hardened systems".
These are languages of diminished flexibility. Their 
connotative richness has been purged. But, he also refers to 
these languages within language as a "spectacular commitment 
of language" belonging to an "elsewhere" of language (20). 
This "elsewhere", can be like the revolutionary Hébert's 
desire to go "beyond language", or like the author's "orphean 
dream" --the attempt to say what is thought to be unsayable 
within the existing language. The "elsewhere" of writing is 
the visionary source of the language system. In Sartrian 
fashion, Barthes says that all writing carries with it "the 
weight of a gaze conveying an intention which is no longer 
linguistic" (20). It is the master signifier which remains 
unnamed, but to which all signs within the system point. This 
gaze is the inspired center of an écriture whose circumference 
may or may not remain open. Political modes, according to 
Barthes, do not have this openness. They are too
"axiological", Barthes says, because they collapse fact and 
value. There is no exchange of terms within its dogmatic 
confines. A closed écriture, one whose terms become "fixed", 
is extremely coercive (20).
Barthes, then, generally considers established modes of 
writing as closed. For him, language is "an abstract circle
of truths, outside of which alone the solid residue of an
. individual logos begins to settle" (9). This seems a rather
cryptic phrase. But it seems to me easily decipherable within
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a structural and phenomenological framework. Structurally, 
language is an "abstract circle of truths" in the sense that 
relations are more important than elements, and that, once 
constituted, language becomes all the more clarified, carrying 
less and less of the "residue" of both the world which it 
"absorbs" and of the individual writer's style. Language 
becomes a clarified metaphor of the world. (I will discuss 
this dynamic below when considering Barthes' conception of 
"style".) As its signs become increasingly ordered, language 
increasingly becomes a self-consistent referential system 
which is closed. It no longer seeks expansion. If it does, 
it will have to absorb more of the non-linguistic and purify 
this over time.
Such a language has boundaries: an "inside" as well as an 
"outside". Literary language is a form which says to the 
writer "here and no further". The writer may not see the 
boundaries. He may view language as a clarity — which is to 
say that he remains within it and thus unconscious of what 
Barthes calls the "problematics of language"—  the 
relationship between language and the world it describes and 
represents — including one's self in-the-worId. Such a writer 
is not apt to question this relation. Merleau-Ponty puts it 
in this way:
We live in a world where speech" is an 
institution. . . . [W]e possess ready-made 
meanings. ... The linguistic and
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intersubjective world no longer surprises 
us, we no longer distinguish it from the 
world itself, and it is within a world 
already spoken and speaking that we 
think. (Phenomenology of Perception, p .
184)
The writer's language gives him a world which he takes 
for "the world", and so he assumes an identity between 
linguistic signifieds and actually existing referents. A 
writer unaware of the "problematics of language" cannot 
radically push the boundaries of his art, because he accepts 
the world as given to him by the language which he inherits.
For Merleau-Ponty language is built up from the sediment 
of speech. There is, then, something of a geological history 
of speech contained in language. (Barthes speaks of the 
"geology" of the text in Writing Degree Zero (85)). But 
nothing is added to a language if all expression and 
representation take place within its boundaries. Only by 
going beyond the "circle" can the subject leave a residue 
which marks the expansion of a language. In order to go
beyond the prescribed circle, there must be an awareness of 
the limiting nature of language as a closed form. Barthes 
says this awareness in literature dates from the middle of the 
nineteenth century, and that it is related to the political 
relation between literature and class divisions in French 
society.̂  Writers began to write for or against the
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bourgeoisie, not just in their choice of content, but in the 
very forms chosen for literary expression.
There appears to be a contradiction, however, in the idea 
of going beyond language. How is it possible to go beyond 
language? What lies beyond language? What can be expressed 
in language which is not now already in it? To go beyond 
language cannot be to express a thought which has not yet 
taken linguistic form. There is no pre-linguistic thought -- 
no thought which isn't shaped by language. Language
constitutes thought. It is not merely the means of
translating thought. We are misled into thinking that this 
is the case, says Merleau-Ponty, by thought which is already 
constituted in language — where no new production of thought 
into language takes place. For the most part language is used 
to give expression to our ideas and intentions. It is fueled 
by desire, not by clearly defined ideas. It is the arena in 
which desire and ideas become complete, become clear. The 
"sense-giving intention" behind speech, then, is not reducible 
to a thought, but can only be defined as a "lack which is
asking to be made good". In the main, language is adequate to
this task, because that which the speaker wishes to express is 
already in the language. Merleau-Ponty defines these
intentions as "pure" thought.
Pure thought reduces itself to a certain 
void of consciousness, to a momentary 
desire. This new sense-giving intention
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knows Itself only by donning already 
available meanings, the outcome of 
previous acts of expression. The
available meanings suddenly link up in 
accordance with an unknown law, and once 
and for all a fresh cultural entity has 
taken on an existence. (Phenomenology of 
Perception. p. 183)
This fresh cultural entity is the individual speech act—  
a very light sedimentary deposit. But what if the "already 
available meanings" are not sufficient to express the 
intention of the speaker? What if the "lack" of the speaker 
is mirrored by a lack of available meanings in the present 
language? The writer who pushes the circle of language is 
motivated by a greater "lack"— a greater desire for language. 
His lack cannot be specifically defined. That would put us 
back inside of language. By definition this something would 
have to be, at least denotatively, unutterable. This is the 
"orphean dream" of which Barthes writes in Degree Zero --the 
dream of saying the un-sayable. The writer labors under this 
"dream" knowing that language "is not so much a stock of 
materials as a horizon, which implies both a boundary and a 
perspective; in short it is the comforting area of an ordered 
space" (W D Z , 9). But the writer which Barthes describes does 
not want this "comfort". Language provides a perspective but 
it also polices his thought. It is an order, and "order
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always indicates repression” (26). Language has a resilient, 
plastic quality to it which resists the individual's effort to 
go outside of it. But, a writer cannot truly claim freedom 
within an already constituted language. And if the writer has 
no measure of freedom within the language he employs, it 
follows that he cannot be engaged (83).
Nothing gets in language that is not somehow already 
represented in it. But, what does one make of Barthes' claim 
that the writer takes nothing from language in the "thrust” 
which goes beyond its horizon? Of course, the writer uses 
language for his expression. He has to do his "thing” . 
Barthes' point is that it isn't language which gets the writer 
"there"— outside of literature— because the language which is 
available to him isn't his own. This is especially true of 
Literary language, but it is also true of language in general. 
The "orphean dream" of which Barthes writes is the dream of 
the creation of new language. We will see that this new 
language comes from "style".
Language, then, is not really the writer's tool. It has 
a history which works against his intention. It is an 
inheritance which he must use, but which has compromised him 
from the very beginning. For Barthes, this "distant setting 
of familiarity" (language) is fundamentally alien to freedom. 
Barthes says that it is a "nature"— a given which, in itself, 
is closed (13). And yet, he argues for a permeability in
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language. This openness can only come from a "circumstance" 
in language which does not belong to it (20).
Style :
In the development of the concept of écriture, Barthes 
opposes "language" not to "speech" but to "style." Ecriture, 
I argue, should be understood as a dialectical freedom which 
emerges, momentarily at least, from two kinds of necessity, or 
two kinds of negativity, confronting the writer: language and 
his own personal style. Lavers argues that both speech and 
écriture function as a safety-valve to release the writer from 
the oppressive natures of language and style (Roland Barthes: 
Structuralism and After, p. 58). But, in saying this she is 
caught up in Barthes' levels of language. Literary expression 
is governed and rule bound, but speech is not. Lacan would 
probably disagree with this conception of the liberating 
faculty of speech, seeing, as he does, that it is not the 
subject who speaks, but rather that the subject is spoken. In 
Lacan the imaginary self is produced by the symbolic --which 
is to say that the subject is determined in language.
Ecriture is different from speech. It becomes quickly 
reified, so that it passes quickly over into closed language - 
-a "mode" of writing. It has a formal duration. Speech, on 
the other hand, has no such duration and functions better as 
the symbol of freedom and autonomy. Language, for Barthes 
then, is in dialectical opposition to style.
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Style IS the mark of the writer's body in his work. It 
is not the style we usually speak of: it is not the product of 
conscious thought or of a reasoned choice. It is, rather, the 
author's linguistic finger-print. It is an unconscious factor 
in literary production. For this reason Barthes says that 
"its frame of reference is biological or biographical, not 
historical"— the historical always implies a freedom and is 
thus opposed to the "natural" in Barthes. Style is the source 
of the writer's individuality, and this source leaves its 
trace on everything which comes from it. Barthes calls it "a 
decorative voice of hidden secret flesh" operative where 
"flesh and external reality come together" (11). Style, then, 
and not language, is the meeting point of the individual 
subject and the world. The individual's language may order 
and structure psychic experience, but it does not determine a 
fundamental being-in-the-worId. The mode of this contact is 
the domain of style. Style is a deep and rather inaccessible 
inwardness which "plunges into the closed recollection of the 
person and achieves its opacity from a certain experience of 
matter" (11-12). Like language, style is also closed. Unlike 
language, however, style is a murky and cumbersome compliment 
to language because it touches "matter". It is this opacity 
which is purged from established modes of writing.
Barthes repeatedly refers to style as an expressive "sub­
language" (11). And this term reappears in Sur Racine (p. 54) 
where, as I shall show, it escapes the structuralist's
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analysis. Its origins are in the "first coition of words and 
things" (10). The fact that style is placed at the confluence 
of flesh and external reality indicates its phenomenologically 
constructive function. It has an interpretive and ordering 
function which allows the world to get into language. Style 
is what first gives us representation of our world. It is the 
body's first language.
Though style makes no appearance independent of a 
signifying intention, it is, nonetheless where "the great 
verbal themes of [the author's] existence come to be 
installed" (10). It "rises up from the writer’s myth-laden 
depths and unfolds beyond his area of control" (11). It adds 
an opacity, but also depth and dimension to the writer's work.
Considered from the point of view of speech {parole), 
style adds a dragging weight to the communication process. 
Communication theory would label style as noise. It will be 
related, some twenty years later, to the "unreadability" 
factor of the modern, "writerly" text analyzed in S/Z. It 
adds a "vertical" dimension to the "horizontality" of speech, 
slowing down the linear flow of clear communication, as it 
were, and burdening it with its density (11). This density, 
however, may serve to obscure or to clarify communication, 
depending on how it is coded.
Style is an element which Barthes adds to what could be 
called the development of the "heterogenous" sign which, 
unlike the Saussurian and Lacanian sign, contains within it
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elements which are not reducible to mental representation. It 
is a sign which is covered, so to speak, with an affective 
coating. Its signified is occulted or absent. The signifier 
functions "archaically," allowing for the condensation of pre- 
symbolic affectivity of the subject. Such a sign is first 
found in Freud's early work on aphasiacs where he says the 
"word"
corresponds to an intricate process of 
associations entered into by elements of 
visual, acoustic and kinaesthetic 
origins. .. The idea, or concept, of the
object is itself another complex of 
associations composed of the most varied 
visual, auditory, tactile, kinaesthetic 
and other impressions. (On Aphasia: A
Critical Study, pp. 77-78).
Kristeva's critique of Lacan is largely based upon this 
early configuration of the Freudian sign which is replaced in 
Lacan by a modification of the Saussurian model: S/s (meaning 
the signifier dominates the signified). Lacan later modifies 
his theory with a concept which is reminiscent of Barthes' 
"style". Lalangue, notes Kristeva, is "completely different 
from the dialogue of the symbol ic--which for Lacan is the 
locus of social exchange— lalangue is called upon to represent 
the real from which linguistics takes its object" (Shuli
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Barzilai, "Borders of Language: Kristeva's Critique of Lacan, 
PMLA V. 106, no. 2, p. 296).
Merleau-Ponty had previously described style in similar 
fashion when describing patients who would read a text and put 
exactly the correct "expression" into it without understanding 
at all what they were saying. This is possible, he wrote, 
because
spoken or written words carry a top 
coating of meaning which sticks to them 
and which presents the thought as a 
style, an affective value, a piece of 
existential mimicry, rather than as a 
conceptual statement. We find here, 
beneath the conceptual meaning of the 
words, an existential meaning which is 
not only rendered by them, but which 
inhabits them, and is inseparable from 
them. (Phenomenology of Perception. p .
182)
Barthes, Merleau-Ponty, Freud, Lacan and Kristeva all 
find an element in language which does not belong to it. That 
is, they all employ a non-Saussurian sign within their 
theories. It is easy to see that, like Barthes, Merleau- 
Ponty's conception of style also has little to do with the 
common conception of style as "form". Style is existentlally 
linked to the individual's affectivity and is in itself
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capable of transmitting attitudinal, affective or gestural 
information even when the denotative message of the words is 
not grasped. This, is exactly what gives "meaning" to the 
revolutionary Hébert's expression. The fact that so much can 
be communicated apart from the content of the language 
suggests that style communicates a good deal more than 
"stylishness". Style, says Barthes, contains "fragments of a 
reality entirely alien to language" (12), and yet these 
fragments which are "secretive" and occult, express themselves 
metaphorically in the author's work.
In contrast to style — which Barthes can compare to 
speech because he considers style a "sub-language" --speech is 
a linear transference of meaning from a producer to a 
consumer, where all is revealed within the limited "duration 
of its flow". Meaning is constantly superseded in a continual 
production and passing away. Words come and go in the medium 
of sound. In the absence of style, there is an admirable 
clarity and economy to the signification in speech because 
meaning is so clearly determined. The beloved "clarity" of 
classical French prose marks an absence of style. (It is for 
this reason that Barthes can say that Gide was a writer 
without style (12)). When meanings are not clearly 
determined, communication falls back upon the affect of style; 
the clarity of speech is greatly hampered. Style tends to 
mislead the communication in speech. And yet for Barthes, 
style, this dark, muted and churning center of the
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individual's logos, is his greatest asset even though he 
cannot control it .
To summarize, in contrast to language, which is a social 
form, style is the individual’s own language, hidden away, and 
thus problematic for the understanding of others. Though it 
is crude and seems to have little desire to be exposed to the 
white light of society (or Lacan's "le nom/non du Père") it is 
the seat of the writer's greatest work. It "transmutes" his 
humors and "carries man to the threshold of power and magic" 
{Degree Zero 12).
Linguistic écriture:
Saussure, I have shown, spoke of the positive value and 
content of the linguistic sign when considered in its totality 
and functioning within the closed system of language. (This 
view has not been forgotten by Derrida, who examines closely 
the relationship between the constituent signs of a system, 
their play, and their relationship to a central, albeit 
deferred, signified, (Structure, Sign and Play in zhe 
Discourse of the Human Sciences). In all other respects the 
signifier and signified have only a negative value, a value 
through pure difference. In a similar way Barthes describes 
the elements of écriture, which again underscores the 
structural nature of his argument. He refers to the elements 
of language as "forms", avoiding the positivist mistake of 
treating etymons as historical substances, and he states that
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"every form is also a Value, which is why there is room 
between a language and a style for another formal reality : 
writing" (13). Lavers points out that this value has a 
dominant ethical connotation in Barthes' argument; but that 
the concept is used, nonetheless, in the Saussurian sense 
(Roland Barthes: Structuralism and A fter, p. 54). When
Saussure wrote that, "in language there are only differences 
without positive terms" (Course, 120) he was promoting the 
idea that in linguistics one must focus on synchronic 
structures rather than historical derivations in determining 
the meaning and value of a term. The "negativity" of 
difference within the structure of language is what provides 
the "positivity" of speech. In Barthes as well, both language 
and style have a negative value based upon différence.
There are many examples of this structuralist logic in 
Degree Zero. Language is conceived negatively as a "nature". 
For example Barthes says that "to say that Camus and Queneau 
speak the same language is merely to presume, by a 
differential operation, all languages, archaic and futuristic, 
that they do not use" (10). The same is true of style, which 
is a sub-language entirely owing to the individual's "carnal 
structure". No two are exactly the same. The negative 
value, then, of both language and style in Barthes, is owing 
to their différence as well as to the freedom which both make 
possible, on the one hand, but tend to exclude on the other. 
Language "is the initial limit of the possible", and style is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
a "necessity which binds the writer's humor to his form of 
expression" (13, my emphasis). For a writer who fails to go 
beyond language, both language and style, Barthes argues, 
appear as a "nature" in which "the energy expended is purely 
operative, serving here to enumerate, there to transform, but 
never to appraise or signify a choice" (13). Such a writer 
does not in any way push or de-center the language he employs. 
The idea that restructuring the language, providing it which 
a new center, provides a new positive re-valuation of its 
terms is not news to Barthes. But he goes further than this, 
for the restructuring of which he speaks profoundly involves 
choice. This choice is the writer's moment of formal 
engagement. It is structurally and existentially the creation 
of a new positive value:
A language and a style are data prior to 
all problematics of language, they are 
the natural product of Time and of the 
person as a biological entity; but the 
formal identity of the writer is truly 
established only outside the permanence 
of grammatical norms and stylistic 
constants, where the written continuum, 
first collected and enclosed within a 
perfectly innocent linguistic nature, at 
last becomes a total sign, the choice of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
a human attitude, the affirmation of a
certain Good (13-14, my emphasis).
To speak of value through difference, and to assign a 
negative value to the two parts of a language taken 
separately, and then to bring these together and speak of a 
total sign, is indeed Saussurian structuralism. Whether 
Barthes' insight comes from keen personal intuition, or a 
general awareness of the claims of structural linguistics is 
not important here. What is remarkable, however, is that, 
like Saussure, and contrary to the fact that today's 
structuralist ideology recognizes only negative value through 
difference, Barthes here, like Saussure, speaks of a positive 
value which results from two negative values, and which 
characterizes a "total sign" (Course 120). Positive 
valuation, which has largely been ignored in structural 
studies because of historical contingency, is nonetheless an 
extremely important aspect of any synchronic study. However, 
unlike Saussure, whose sign is purely psychological, the 
Barthesian sign is dynamically reproduced by a freedom, rather 
than simply inherited. The moment of écriture is, for
Barthes, the re-affirmation of the non-motivated relation 
which exists between signifier and signified, as well as the 
affirmation of "play" in a healthy linguistic system. This 
"play" is what separates language from a system of 
nomenclature. The movement which takes the writer outside of 
language (the orphean dream), transforms his language when
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language expresses the vision of this dream. And what is 
perhaps most interesting of the phenomenological aspect of 
Barthes' description of the "total sign" is that its moment of 
birth is characterized as an "innocence". It is "enclosed 
within a perfectly innocent linguistic nature". This 
"innocence", I believe, is to be identified with the arbitrary 
nature of the sign itself. Interestingly, Barthes associates 
this freedom of language, which exists only through choice, 
with the expressive freedom of the whole body. Ecriture is 
rooted in the body owing to its partial origin in "style". It
is the release of the body's language.
One further consideration: one may object and say that
in arguing for a structural reading of Writing Degree Zero I 
am speaking of two different "total signs": linguistic in
Saussure, and literary in Barthes. One is composed of
signifiers and signifieds; the other of a language and a 
style. I argue that we are simply speaking of two different 
orders of the same phenomenon. The new sign, in Saussure, 
takes its positive content only through a reflection which 
involves the whole of the ambient language. The sign of which 
Barthes speaks involves not only the whole of a language; but 
also the whole of the individual— the individual's 
relationship to his mother tongue and to himself as
constituted, in the Lacanian sense, by this language, as well 
as that part of him which is structured as a "sub-language": 
his own personal "style". The difference is that, in
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Saussure, the individual remains at the static end of any 
linguistic process. All change is too large, too slow to 
involve him. In Barthes, on the other hand, the individual's 
relation with language is given more flexibility through 
écriture — even though language remains in itself a negative 
entity.
It is, I believe, useful to remember that in Saussure all 
discussion of the "sign" takes place at the object level of 
science. I mean by this that the "sign" is almost always 
conceived at the level of the word, or at least beneath the 
level of the sentence. For Barthes, the signifier of a sign 
is almost always conceived as beyond the word. This explains 
why he may speak of a "total sign" in which language is but a 
part. Barthes is very daring in applying structuralist 
insight to linguistic phenomena. For him "language" may 
designate the mother tongue, literary prescriptions, and other 
signifying systems at various levels of relation with language 
proper. In The Fashion System language is always only one 
part of a sign, which is otherwise composed of photographs. 
In Mythologies he demonstrates that a whole expanse of 
language may function as a single signifier, as in a novel 
(120). Indeed, this claim is the whole basis behind Writing 
Degree Zero: that literature itself is a sign subject to
historical interpretation.
In Saussure, the arrival of a new sign changes the 
prescriptions of selection in the paradigm in which it
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functions. That is to say, a new distribution of meaning and 
value results between the signs in the paradigm. In Barthes, 
the new total sign is the destabilization of a previous 
language. The old order of language may appear to remain, but 
all is charged with new valence.
This new language is problematic for communication. 
Barthes describes the difficulty of reading écriture when he 
discusses the "writerly text" in The Pleasure of the Text, 
when it is the boredom of such texts that makes jouissance 
possible. With écriture, that is with new language, comes the 
possibility of a new world. This brings me back again to 
Merleau-Ponty.
Although Merleau-Ponty disagreed with the concept of the 
conventional sign in Phenomenology of Perception (because of 
the argument which holds that the sign does not have content-- 
which is to say he did not see the positive content 
established by a given synchrony of language), he nonetheless 
has the same dynamic explanation for the birth of meaning that 
we find in Barthes. For Merleau-Ponty the creation of the 
sign is gestural and, most importantly, involves the whole 
body as a signifying boundary (Phenomenology , 180). The new 
"spoken word" in Merleau-Ponty is similar to the new sign in 
Barthes. It is "a gesture, and its meaning, the world" (184). 
This gesture in Merleau-Ponty, like the sign in Barthes, is 
not the translation of a pre-determined thought. How could it 
be? The gesture is rather the accomplishment of this unformed
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pure thought (178). Saussure and Merleau-Ponty come together 
in Barthes' écriture. For all three thinkers, and despite 
Merleau-Ponty's argument with structural linguistics at this 
time, the creation of a sign is the co-creation or what 
Merleau-Ponty more aptly terms the accomplishment of a 
signifier (gesture) and a new signified (thought). For 
Merleau-Ponty and for Barthes the new signifying gesture 
deeply involves the body, calling upon its unique "style" in 
the groping process of finding adequate language for an idea 
beyond language.
There are significant similarities between Merleau-Ponty 
and Barthes regarding the subject of new language. In Degree 
Zero Barthes refers to the repository of the individual's 
source of new expression as a "gestuary," which reminds one of 
Merleau-Ponty's "gesticulation"— the body's expressiveness in 
language. The juxtaposition of Merleau-Ponty with Brondal in 
Elements of Semiology, the similarity between Barthes' 
écriture and Merleau-Ponty’s conception of new language, the 
positive content of the sign (which Merleau-Ponty was by no 
means willing to let go), and the role of the body speak of 
Merleau-Ponty's influence on Barthes. This influence may not 
explain much of the structural aspect of Barthes' thought, but 
It does help to explain the occult and neglected content of 
Writing Degree Zero which escapes and survives this structural 
period. I shall discuss this below in my treatment of Sur 
Racine which marks the apex of Barthes' work in structuralism.
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What escapes this approach is precisely the aleatory element 
of the body developed here.
In Michelet and later in Sade Fourrier et Loyola Barthes 
develops in greater detail his consideration of the role of 
the body, especially in regard to figurative expression. What 
interests Barthes in Michelet is not so much Michelet's 
narrative of history, which Barthes says is predictably 
determined by a bourgeois perspective, but Michelet's 
introduction of personal and highly unusual figures in the 
historical narrative. What interests Barthes is Michelet's 
écriture. That écriture, says Barthes, is a function of 
Michelet's personal, bodily relation to history. Michelet, it 
is known, suffered horribly from migraines and nausea brought 
about by what Barthes calls his "eating" of history. His were 
"historical migraines".
Everything was like migraine to him: the 
cold, a storm, spring, the wind, the 
history he was narrating. ... Michelet’s 
whole body becomes a product of his own 
creation, and he established in himself a 
surprising sort of symbiosis between the 
historian and history. The nausea, the 
dizzy spells and the depressions no 
longer come only from the seasons and 
climates; it is the very horror of
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narrative history that provokes them,
(17-18).
It is possible that Barthes is captivated by the romantic 
image of the writer who suffers for his work. But his 
discussion on style, I believe, absolves him of naively 
romanticizing such activity.
Barthes is captivated as well by Michelet's peculiar 
obsessions. The old historian was obsessed by bodily humors, 
most notably the menstrual blood of his young wife — the 
suffering in the productive function. Wife and the World 
intertwine in Michelet. Michelet loved the world's body, its 
waters from which the fish are born and every thing slippery, 
sliding, and silken like a woman's body, a woman's skin. 
History is gendered. It is male and female, moving in 
accordance with the rhythms of birth, life and death. World- 
woman gives her body to history's figures. History is flesh. 
Barthes finds the key to Michelet's writing in the view that 
"In the final analysis, all history rests upon the human
body," and he cites the early Marx who writes that the first
task of the historian is to appreciate the "corporal
organization of these individuals and the relation which this 
organization gives them to the whole of Nature" (Michelet, 
80 ) .
What gives Michelet's écriture its special flavor is not 
just that he writes "from the body", but that he is so at
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pains to be aware of the bodies of his historical subjects. 
In Michelet, Barthes notes that :
The historical subject has almost no 
psychology; he is reduced to a single 
substance, and if he is condemned, it is 
not by his motives or his acts, but by
virtue of the attraction or repulsion
which is attached to his flesh. ... The 
human body is thus an immediate 
judgement, but its value is of an 
existential order, and not intellectual.
Michelet condemns by virtue of his 
nausea, not by his principles. (86, my 
translation.)
I will examine more closely Barthes’ concern for the body 
in my last chapter. I mention it here only to indicate the 
degree to which the body is truly associated with écriture in 
Barthes. It would be a mistake then, in my view, to see only
the ethical aspect of écriture which is so easily recognized
in Writing Degree Zero, and to fail to appreciate that Barthes 
is concerned with the body as a signifying boundary which is 
active in the structuring of new language. This concern for 
the body is found not only in his later works, but from the 
very start. The concept of écriture must be understood, I 
argue, from the point of view of its linguistic determination
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which, in the final analysis, outweighs the ethical 
determination in the remainder of Barthesian thought.
In the following chapter I propose to put my reading of 
écriture to the test in solving the problem of poetry in 
Barthesian literary theory. Commentators have given widely 
varying explanations for Barthes' position against a 
"humanism" of modern poetry. I believe the concept of 
écriture developed here can help to explain Barthes' unusual 
theoretical position.
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End Notes:
1. In fact Sartre's apparent formal distinction between 
poetry and prose as literary forms which can or cannot support a 
political engagement collapses into a distinction of content. 
There are three major periods to consider in determining Sartre's 
perspective on the question of poetic engagement. In L ’homme et 
les Choses, Sartre roundly criticizes Françis Ponge for his 
"mineralization" of man. In Qu'est-ce que la littérature Sartre 
states categorically that poetry is incapable of a lucid 
communication of a political message. But, in Orphé Noir, he 
applauds the poets of the negritude movement for their engagement 
and cites the simplicity of the message — the reclaiming (or 
inventing) of black soul—  as the reason for its political success. 
The opacity of the poetic medium is remedied by this simplicity, as 
well as by a common code sustained by the black experience which, 
Sartre claims, uses the French language even as it tries to destroy 
it.
2. Barthes writes in his introduction that "Classical art 
could have no sense of being a language, for it was language .." 
( WDZ, 3). This cryptic phrase can only be understood by following 
out the implications of Barthes idea of the birth and evolution of 
literary language. It is first burdened with the heavy signs of 
the writer's sous-langage, which are idiosyncratic tropes and 
neologisms— all of which call attention to the fact that one is in
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the presence of new language because of its awkwardness. Classical 
(French) language, on the other hand, has been purified through the 
manipulation of many writers working under the same prescriptions, 
through the classification of figures and the codification of their 
use. The language becomes so highly stylized as to lack that style 
which belongs to the individual's body. This language of 
literature has no competitors after the decline of baroque writing. 
It is a clarified language, and one has direct access to its 
signifieds. It is for this reason that Barthes says that classical 
language leaves no "deposit".
3. In the Phenomenology of Perception (1945, trans. 1962), 
Merleau-Ponty does not yet make the same langue/parole distinction 
as Saussure. He does so later, for example in Signs (Gallimard, 
1960). Saussure does not speak of parole as an institution, but 
rather reserves this status for langue. It is interesting to note, 
then, that Merleau-Ponty and Barthes are both keenly aware of 
speech as having an institutional character, one which reflects the 
presence of a certain "determinacy" in language. By "determinacy", 
I mean the determination of signs by a system outside of language, 
such as ideology. However, like Saussure, Merleau-Ponty places 
speech in an anterior relationship to language. Language becomes 
the "sediment" of speech which "constitutes an acquisition for use 
in human relationships. (Phenomenology, p. 190).
4. Several authors have noted that Barthes' analysis does not 
stand for a History of general literature; that his claims are 
based solely upon the analysis of a few French authors. (See
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Philip Thody's, Roland Barthes: A Conservative Estimate. Chicago, 
1977). But it is, in my view, the model of Barthes' analysis which 
is of value here, not some deliberation on its universal 
applicability, or the priority of French Literature over any other- 
-something which Barthes never claimed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3
Ecriture, ethics and the problem of poetry:
I have argued for a linguistic approach to Writing Decree 
Zero showing how this work is informed by the langue/parole 
distinction. Écriture, I have stated, is something of a hi- 
bred concept at two levels. Ethically it represents the 
writer's moral and political choice in the face of literary 
language which becomes historically compromised as its signs 
come to serve bourgeois ideology. Linguistically, it is the 
creation of a language within language, a new system of 
relations, which provides for the expression of an Orphic 
dream, a brief innocence of language. The concept is hi-bred 
in another sense as well. Unlike the Saussurian sign, 
écriture, considered as a sign, transcends the purely 
linguistic and incorporates within its "practice" — for it is 
an activity—  elements which belong solely to the individual, 
that is, style and body. This sign, then, already contains 
much of what is to follow in Barthes' subsequent works.
Barthes' object in Writing Degree Zero was to establish 
a historical connection between literature and its signs on 
the one hand, and the history of class division and struggle 
on the other. Class conflict, he believed, is reflected in 
the development of écriture, in the establishment of various
63
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"modes of writing", and in the production of new "signs" of 
literature which indicate the writer's choice in writing for 
or against the bourgeoisie. But, what exactly are these 
telltale signs of literature? Are they the figures and 
metaphors used by a writer? Or do they involve a deeper 
structure (or structuration) of the narrative form?
Barthes analyzes écriture in the Novel and in History and 
shows how both are narrative forms extremely dependant upon 
the preterit verb tense which he calls "the unreal time of 
cosmogonies, myths. History and Novels" by which events are no 
longer perceived as mysterious or absurd (30). This verb 
tense, he says, is one of the obsessive signs of the bourgeois 
narrative. The preterit renders an event as "a lie made 
manifest, it delineates an area of plausibility which reveals 
the possible in the very act of unmasking it as false" (32). 
The content of these narratives, he suggests, is credible but, 
at the same time, flaunted as an illusion. Illusion — a 
falsehood—  serves the "truths" of bourgeois ideology. Behind 
this mechanism, Barthes suggests, is the bourgeois myth by 
which the power of "universal truths" is shown to "fecundate" 
even through the fictitious character of its art. 
Narratives, then, — especially those belonging to the literary 
canon—  have a palpable pedagogical function which is 
accomplished only through literature's "second-order appeal" 
to bourgeois dogma. Here we see the seeds of Mythologies.
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He then analyzes the various uses of the "obsessive" sign 
of the third person in the Novel. The "he" of the Novel 
becomes a "victory" of the "I" inasmuch as it conjures up a 
state at once more literary and more absent." (37) This 
convention runs the risk of belittling the characters, says 
Barthes, and of giving the narrative an unexpected sense of 
destiny, so it is an unstable convention which can be used 
consciously by the author to attack the conventions of 
Literature. Nonetheless, this convention has considerable 
power over its audience through the ideologically strengthened 
belief in the independent ego.
"Modernism", says Barthes, "begins with the search for a 
Literature which is no longer possible" (38). It is clear by 
this statement that there is considerable continuity between 
the early Barthes and the later author of S/Z and The Pleasure 
of the Text. The "readerly" and the "writerly" texts are 
concepts which are in nascent form in Writing Degree Zero.
Barthes describes the Novel as a tool by which society 
accomplishes a transcendence. The writer, then, must be under 
a social obligation. He transforms life into a meaningful and 
well oriented death, allowing the sincerity of society to feed 
on a body of "conspicuous falsehood". It is a "food" which 
can be consumed but which forever leaves its trace in literary 
practices. But, by serving up this literary cake, the 
writer's écriture becomes indentured. Rather than écriture 
Barthes terms this writing écrivance. The writer has become
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a scribe. Such a writer is knowingly an accomplice to his own 
alienation.
But there is question about the ethical nature of poetry 
in Writing Degree Zero. And it is very difficult to resolve 
questions pertaining to the status of poetry, because, as 
Vincent Jouve points out, Writing Degree Zero is the only work 
in which Barthes recognizes the specificity of poetry. The 
reading of écriture which I propose here, helps, I believe to 
better understand the problem.
Barthes considers classical poetry to be based upon the 
same mode of writing as is classical prose. It is the same 
language, so it shares the same écriture (42). The only 
difference is the ornamentation which announces it as poetry. 
If one names these ornamentations as "A", "B" and "C”
(possibly representing the conventions of the alexandrin, 
rhyme or stock images— all of which Barthes describes as 
"useless") poetry, then could, be summed up by Mr. Jourdain's 
formula (in Molière*s The Bourgeois Gentilhomme) as "Poetry = 
Prose+a+b+c" (41). Classical poetry, according to Barthes, is 
"never a different language, or the product of a particular 
sensibility." It is a highly social form of writing, somewhat 
burdened by its ornamentation, but which never attempts to 
deviate from the canons of logic and clarity which define the 
classical mode for prose. In a statement reminiscent of 
Merleau-Ponty, Barthes writes that the classical view of 
poetry is one which expects the form to translate a "ready­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
made thought" which is the product of a fossilized language 
into the proscribed language of poetry — itself a language 
which has been made "relational, which means that in it words 
are abstracted as much as possible in the interest of 
relationships." Borrowing from Merleau-Ponty, Barthes calls 
such language "mathematical". (Merleau-Ponty, in "Indirect 
Language and the Voices of Silence" describes any language 
which no longer tries to absorb new matter as an "algebra"). 
The abstract transparency in question is not a transparency 
which allows language to touch the real. No language does 
this, according to Barthes. Rather, transparency is the 
absence of style within the language — an absence which may 
very well lead to an uncritical attitude towards language and 
support the idea that such language is natural and, therefore, 
does touch reality.
Merleau-Ponty is more optimistic than Barthes, however, 
stating that such speech "differentiates significations no one 
of which is known separately; it is by treating them as known 
(and as giving us an abstract picture of them and their 
interrelations) that language ends up imposing the most 
precise identification upon us in a flash" (Signs, p. 44). 
Language signifies when instead of copying thought it lets 
itself be taken apart and put together again by thought. 
There is nothing new in such a language--neither in its 
thought (signifieds) nor in its expression (signifiers).
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Classical écriture is a medium designed for the 
uninterrupted flow of a sanctioned idea. Its vocabulary is 
one of use, not of invention. It does not contain "the depth 
and singularity of an individual experience" (45), by which 
Barthes means that it is a language devoid of the individual 
body and its style discussed above. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with such a language, in Barthes* view. He 
objects, however, to certain consequences which result from a 
fixed language. These are many. Such a language becomes 
highly coded — to the point that it is more suited to 
communication than to artistic expression dependant upon the 
"play" in language. (For this reason Barthes says that 
classical language is essentially a "spoken" language (49), 
not because millions of Frenchmen orally recite La 
Rochefoucauld, but because classical language, like speech, 
has reduced ambiguity.) Such a language invites the immediate 
investment of a sanctioned signified, promoting the idea that 
the expression is to judged on the merits of this signified. 
It becomes a self-satisfied language which lays claim to a 
natural relationship between language and the world. It 
fosters the belief that the existing state of the language is 
sufficient to possess the world (49). In this way it
"polices" thought.
In contrast to classical poetry, modern poetry works 
behind language, as it were, trying to exploit the 
contingencies of language so as to evoke an idea which has
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most certainly gone through, or is the result of, a critical 
reflection upon language itself. From Hugo on, writes 
Barthes, poetry has tended towards an "explosion" of words. 
Modern poetry distinguishes itself from classical poetry, and 
from any form of prose, classical or modern, Barthes says, 
because of its attempt to destroy
the spontaneously functional nature of 
language, and leave standing only its 
lexical basis. It retains only the 
outward shape of relationships, their 
music, but not their reality. The Word 
shines forth above a line of 
relationships emptied of their content, 
grammar is bereft of its purpose, it 
becomes prosody and is no longer anything 
but an inflection which acts only to 
present the Word. (46-47)
Poetry is somehow antithetical to the "nature" of language. 
It is interesting that Barthes writes of the "spontaneously 
functional nature of language" in condemning modern poetry 
when he has so opposed the "natural" elsewhere. What is the 
"natural" function of language? It is communication within 
the context of speech — the selective use of signs whose 
signifieds are reduced to a uniform flow by context. Speech, 
Barthes says in Lecon. is "immediately assertive". Like a 
magic wand, it tends to produce a signified. It has an
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"implacable power of designation", so much so, that "negation, 
doubt, contingency, the suspension of judgement require 
particular operators which are themselves taken over by a play 
of masks" (15). The expressive and productive aspect of 
speech, like Hébert's obscenities, is secondary in language to 
the function of nomination. This tenancy towards nomination, 
towards fixity, produces rigidity in the language. Speech 
requires the "determination" of linguistic signs for the 
clarity necessary to communication. Speech, Derrida says, 
"communicates a determined content, an identifiable meaning, 
a describable value." (Margins of Philosophy, p.309, 1982,
[quoted in Weiss]). Polysemy is largely reduced in speech 
through the establishment of a single code by context. 
Barthes, on the other hand, describes speech as "empty". This 
view of speech might seem incomprehensible if one fails to 
understand the role of the body in écriture. Barthes says of 
speech in Writing Degree Zero that it is
nothing but a flow of empty signs, the 
movement of which alone is significant.
The whole of speech is epitomized by the 
expandability of words, in this froth 
ceaselessly swept onwards, and speech is 
found only where language self-evidently 
functions like a devouring process which 
swallows only the moving crest of the 
words. Writing, on the contrary, is
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always rooted in something beyond 
language. (19).
By "empty signs" Barthes means signs which are (pre-) 
determined through repetition, signs whose function within the 
system of communication have been settled. Their content is 
"crested" for the economy needed by speech. They are empty in 
the sense that they contain nothing of the body of the 
signifying agent.
In a language which anticipates that of Mythologies 
Barthes describes the word in poetry as a vertical sign which 
is made up of overly determined significations. In Barthes' 
view, the modern poetic phrase signifies everything which it 
could say, because it is not caught up in the horizontality of 
a speech intention. There is no identifiable communicative 
context in poetry. It is a language without a functional
nature. It is as though it wants to function as an
etymological dictionary, and yet, "it is an act without an 
immediate past" and "without environment" (47). Poetry cuts 
across any given moment (synchrony) of language, even the 
present, in its "hunger" for the total meaning of the word. 
There simply is no structure, no possible ethos which defines 
the relation of the modern poet to society, and thus there is 
no poetic écriture. This lack in modern poetry, says Barthes, 
makes speech terrible and inhuman. It 
initiates a discourse full of gaps and 
full of lights, filled with absences and
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over-nourishing signs, without foresight 
of stability of intention, and thereby so 
opposed to the social function of 
language that merely to have recourse to 
a discontinuous speech is to open the 
door to all that stands above Nature.
(48)
It is clear that for Barthes écriture must be deployed 
within a social intention. From this, Barthes concludes that 
there can be no humanism, no écriture of modern poetry (50). 
For him, such poetry is fundamentally an attempt to modify 
nature. "In it. Nature becomes a fragmented space, made of 
objects solitary and terrible, because the links between them 
are only potential" (50). Modern poetry is trying to get 
behind language, even to destroy it by fragmenting it; it 
wants to touch the thing-in-itself.
If, for Barthes, the world is structured like a language, 
maintaining the infinity of its terms within a grammar, then 
modern poetry can be no reflection of this world.
[W]hen poetic language radically 
questions Nature by virtue of its very 
structure, without any resort to the 
content of the discourse and without 
falling back on some ideology, there is 
no mode of writing left, there are only 
styles, thanks to which man turns his
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back on society and confronts the world 
of objects without going through any of 
the forms of History or of social life 
(52) .
Barthes' analysis of poetry reveals the view that 
écriture needs a syntactical and social structure capable of 
sustaining a string of signifieds — some semblance of an 
ideology. It must allow for the selection of signifieds as 
well as their coherent union. In other words, Barthes 
requires of poetry a partial respect for the semantic history 
of words and of the rules of language which allow for their 
association. Modern poetry risks collapsing into the sous- 
langage of style — the language of the individual body—  a 
"logos" cut off from all others.
This judgement of poetry, of course, has its dissenters: 
among them Jonathan Culler who suggests that there is in fact 
an écriture of modern poetry, but that Barthes may disfavor it 
for the reason that, as an anti-poetry, it is too successful 
in resisting recuperation by literature (Roland Barthes New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 59). That is to say, 
it too successfully completes the movement toward anti-poetic 
poetry, whereas anti-literature eventually collapses into 
literature. He notes the difference here between Sartre and 
Barthes. Sartre, in O u 'est-ce que la Littérature argued, in 
a somewhat classical way, that prose was used to describe and 
discuss the world (nature) and that poetry was an experimental
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form, a playing with language. Sartre, oriented by content, 
whereas Barthes is concerned with the responsibility of form, 
excluded linguistic "play" and so excluded poetry from the 
domain of ethical writing. Here we see that for Barthes the 
reasoning is reversed. Poetry moves asocially towards the 
essences of nature, whereas prose, the experimental form, is 
available to human transcendence through its "play". Culler 
suggests that Barthes is unhappy with our tendency to read 
into such poetry a plenitude of meaning, when we could see it 
more as the total absence of meaning — the virginity of empty 
signs. But this view fails to understand the role of the 
body's sous-langage in any écriture. Where there is "play" 
between the elements of the sign there is the space for the 
writing of the body. Barthes does not pine for empty signs 
anymore than he wishes for the "full" signs of ideological 
language. "Death of the Father", he writes in The Pleasure of 
the Text, "would deprive literature of many of its pleasures. 
... Isn't story telling .. speaking one's conflicts with the 
Law" (fT 47). What he longs for is the recognition that there 
is room for "play" in language --by virtue of the lack of 
motivation between the elements of the sign. He does not 
consider the signs of modern poetry empty but, rather, too 
full. "The word", he says, "is like a monolith, or a pillar 
which plunges into a totality of meanings, reflexes, and 
recollections" (47). Nor does he want to empty the sign. In 
Elements of Semiology he takes up his goal of the "zero
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degree" in writing, noting that "it is not a total absence 
(this is a common mistake), it is a significant absence" (77).
Ecriture is the meshing of the deep language of the 
individual, style, with the mother tongue. In The Pleasure of 
the Text. Barthes says that "the writer is someone who plays 
with his mother's body .. : in order to glorify it, to
embellish it, or in order to dismember it, to take it to the 
limit of what can be known about the body" (37). The writer's 
relationship to his language is clearly "incestuous". It is 
the very same relation which Ben Stolfuz finds in Robbe- 
Grillet's Le Mirroir qui Revient. ("Toward Bliss: Barthes, 
Lacan, And Robbe-Grillet" Modern Fiction Studies. vol. 35 
1989). Language (mother/mother tongue) is the domain of the 
"symbolic" — the Law, the Father. The mother is taken over by 
the father just as language is taken over by ideology. If one 
can extract from this field the impregnation of ideology (the 
Law, the Father), then the "imaginary" (the displaced 
"written" self) is free to immerse its "real" (the primitive, 
instinctual self) in the "symbolic". But, without the mother 
tongue, that is, without its structure, there is no receptacle 
for the subject's desire. Barthes' argument with poetry, in 
my opinion, has less to do with the supposed emptiness or 
plenitude of signs in poetry, than with the lack of a possible 
discourse (textuality/body) with which the reader can mingle 
his/her body. "I am on the side of structure, of the
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sentence, of the phrased text" he writes in Roland Barthes 
(96, my translation).
Barthes' discussion of Asian literary forms is helpful 
here. Between the alternatives "plenitude of unstructurable 
meaning" and "structures of empty signs", the latter is 
preferable, for Barthes, because it is closer to what he 
calls an "adequate discourse". The concept of "adequate 
discourse" merits further study in Barthesian theory. It can 
be considered the last evolutionary step in what could be 
termed Barthes' geometrical concern for language, that is, its 
circumference considered as structure before he turns to 
structuration. It is most closely associated with language 
{langue) and is the terminal structure in Barthes' process of 
analyzing smaller and smaller units of language. Barthes' 
first concern with language was with the whole of literary 
language as in Writing Degree Zero. Next he considered a 
corpus of literary language (as in Sur Racine). positing a 
langue/parole relationship between the generated model of this 
corpus, the simulacra, and the actual body of literature under 
investigation. The simulacra, which is the sum of the 
relations and functions found within the corpus, is analyzed 
from the point of view of another (sub-) language system such 
as psychoanalytic or Marxist language. Sur Racine marks the 
height of Barthes' structuralist period. And Barthes gives an 
accessible account of the method behind Sur Racine in "The 
Structuralist Activity" — the most anthologized of his
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articles. Though a highly responsible and engaged model of 
criticism, Barthes soon dismisses it for the closure which 
defines its signifieds. Finally Barthes rejects even the use 
of meta-languages in favor of a "science of literature" whose 
task is not to provide a content for the work, but to
illustrate how a content, or a plurality of contents, is 
possible. (Criticism And Truth, pp. 73-74). S/Z is the
product of this decision. No unified reading of the text is
offered. Rather, Barthes offers an analysis of the polysemy 
characteristic of the "readerly" text whose unity is only 
that which the reader ascribes to the text at the object level 
of language. Such a science does not call upon a secondary, 
analytic language. It does not produce a meta-linguistic 
criticism. It is interested only in addressing the plurality 
of voices within a given text. In his own writing, Barthes 
even begins to break the unity of the language of the literary 
object. A Lover's Discourse is Barthes' example of the
collapsing of a literary language and a critical discourse in 
one and the same artistic form. In "Science versus 
Literature," Barthes argues for the collapse of criticism into 
the literary object.
The logical continuation of structuralism 
can only be to rejoin literature, no 
longer as an "object" of analysis but as 
the activity of writing, to do away with 
the distinction derived from logic which
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turns the work itself into a language- 
object and science into a meta-language, 
and thus to forego that illusory 
privilege which science attaches to the 
possession of a captive language. fLe 
Bruissement de la Langue, p . 17, my
translation.)
This collapse of criticism into the literary object is marked 
by two new critical movements. Having argued from the
beginning of his career for the uncertain space within 
language, the interstices of meaning within the word, Barthes 
finally returns to the common idiom and employs the poetic 
freedom which he had earlier maintained. Second, he writes in 
the form of fragments and waves the banner of the arbitrary in 
language by organizing the fragments alphabetically by title. 
Such writing engenders the polysemy which he admires in the 
text. This is because long, un-broken expanses of text 
constantly invite the invasion of an ideology or, which 
amounts to the same thing for Barthes, the positing of a 
unified subject (an author), or signified behind the text, 
which, in turn, determines the signification of signs. "An 
ideally free language", Barthes had written as early as 
Writing Degree Zero, "never could function as a sign of my own 
person, and would give no information whatsoever about my 
history and my freedom" (27). This statement clearly
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anticipates Barthes' call for the "death of the author" in 
critical analysis.
An "adequate discourse", then, is closely related to 
Barthes' idea of the fragment. In Barthes par Barthes he 
remarks upon the difficulty in locating a subject behind 
fragmentary writing:
To write in fragments: fragments are thus 
the rocks around the perimeter of the 
circle. I spread myself around: my whole 
little universe in crumbs; in the center, 
what? {Barthes par Barthes, p. 87; my 
translation)
Fragmentary writing creates a minimal expanse of the 
signifier. Its attributed signified becomes the
responsibility of the reader, since it cannot be attributed to 
the author. The fragment serves the reader's opportunity for 
pleasure or jouissance within its contours. An "adequate 
discourse", then, is a discourse aware that it is essentially 
language and which, like haiku, knows that it "is not at all 
an exact painting of the real, but a merging of signifier and 
signified" as an event. This emergence of language is 
perfectly representational of écriture. Haiku is close to 
poetry because it is where Barthes finds the example of the 
emergence of a "thing" into language. It is permeable
language. Haiku gives him "the fragile essence of
appearance." It is that "strictly speaking ungraspable moment
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in which the thing, though nothing but language, will become 
speech" (Empire des Signes. 1970 p. 100) One sees that 
Barthes is still concerned with the emergence of new language- 
-what he terms at this point "'the awakening to the fact' a 
grasp of the thing as event, not as substance" (101).
In her article addressing Barthes' interest in the Asian
poetic forms {haiku and satori) Trin Min-hah argues that
Barthes finds essentially what he has been looking for; the
experience of the free signifier which she calls the "plural
void" — which is a "commentary resisting comment". ("The
Plural Void: Barthes on Asia", Substance vol. 36 p. 44). This
void, she explains is the effect of "a tissue which is formed
as its meshes (mirage, event, nothing, unreal reality, the
matte, suspension) take shape". This tissue, this signifier,
allows for the production of a "marginal truth" which in haiku
suggests Nothingness or Relativity, but 
does not signify them. Closely linked 
with the nothing of Non-identity, the 
Void is however a synonym for tathata, 
the Non-Void or, more precisely, the This 
(le Tel). This apparently contradictory 
coupling is, naturally, intentional. It 
prevents the conceptualization of the 
Void, for the "true Void" is not a 
concept, it is the void of the tathata ..
It neither expresses nor describes, it 
designates and reproduces the gesture of 
a small child who points at something 
saying only "This!" in an unmediated 
movement free from any sense of finalism 
(47).
Barthes' many faceted ethos of the signifier, then, 
functions as far as the individual's experience of the void 
even when this signifier cannot signify this void as a
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concept. What keeps haïku (unlike modern poetry) within the 
realm of écriture, I argue, is that it takes place within a 
minimal syntactical environment. Unlike modern poetry, it is 
a closed form. (Empire p. 101) Its closure, however is not 
on the side of the signified but on that of the signifier. 
Haïku is made of simple, everyday language. Trin Min-ha notes 
the structure of haïku.
Haiku is written in perfectly readable 
discourse; it cannot therefore be called 
nonsense, nor can meaning be imposed on 
it. The exemption from meaning within 
meaning itself is to be understood not as 
abolition, but as "suspension" of
meaning. {Plural Void, p. 45)
In haiku Barthes has found a short expanse of signifier 
which defies the imposition of a signified. This form best 
exemplifies non only a fresh emergence of language but also 
reminds one that everyday language is built upon arbitrary 
signs which only thinly mask a void which is ever retreating 
from the naming process. Haïku, as a form, satisfies another 
requirement of écriture: that pertaining to the body as
mentioned in Michelet. Trin Min-ha notes that it is a form 
which "receives but does not conserve" (45). It is a form 
which appeals to and engages the sous-langage of the body 
because it is a mirror which "captures only other mirrors and 
whose infinite reflection is emptiness itself" (104). Haiku
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is also a respite from the linguistically constituted self. 
"The time of haïku", Barthes writes, "is without subject" 
(101). It produces a "shattering of that inner speech which 
makes us persons" (97).
Modern poetry, then, is not so much an enigma for 
Barthesian theory as a problem which can be solved by 
understanding the various roles which écriture plays within 
this theory. Barthes' eudemonistic approach to language 
provides the key to resolving the problem of his view of 
poetry. Language is the arena of pleasure and of jouissance. 
In order to involve the body in language, in order to lose 
one’s self within its signifiers, a displacement must occur. 
There are two logical possibilities: either new signs must be 
produced within the language or the existing signs within the 
language must be made available to new signifieds. The first 
possibility represents the activity of modern poetry. New 
signs are produced having nothing to do with the structure of 
the mother tongue. Between them, they lack the coherence 
which this first order system can provide. Such poetry may 
engage the mythic themes of the writer (his style) but it is 
not a mythic form as is the rest of literature. (In 
Mythologies Barthes writes that mythic systems — which include 
all of literature for the reason that it is language built 
upon language—  must be built upon already signifying systems 
(110)). On the other hand, to use the mother language is to 
struggle with an ideology which is already embedded in it.
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New "modes” only briefly escape the problem. If successful, 
they soon becomes established modes within literature thus 
serving its ideological aims. Barthes' ultimate solution to 
this problem is the fragment — a limited expanse of 
signification sufficient to support a "gaze" beyond language, 
but which resists ideological impregnation as it resists a 
determined signification.
Ecriture throws into question the internal relation of 
all signs within a system. It re-distributes signifieds which 
only tend to "jell" once again, ideologically. (The Pleasure 
of the Text. 28). The re-establishment of "play" within a 
rigid system is the experience of jouissance. The "play" 
which results between the signifiers allows for the insertion 
of the individual's "logos", his body. In the case of haïku, 
the signifieds are suspended even within a commonplace 
language. Barthes refers to the "adequate discourse" which 
characterizes all of haikai as "a polite host who permits you 
to make yourself at home, with all your obsessions, values, 
and symbols" (89).
In the first and second chapter of this work I made 
reference to the similarities between the "total" signs found 
in both Saussurrian and Barthesian theory. They are 
different, of course, owing to the levels of language at which 
they are operative. And yet, as I discussed in chapter 2, 
they function according to the same model as far as "value" is 
concerned. Barthes simply applies the concept of language
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{langue) in a broader fashion than did Saussure. However, 
viewed from the model of the sign in Saussure, that of 
écriture merits further distinction. The Barthesian sign of 
écriture is composed of an already constituted language which 
is impregnated by the writer's/reader's own sub-language which 
accounts for the desire to go beyond language, and which 
Barthes finds rooted in the individual's body.
The signifier in écriture is language itself. It can 
function as a signifier because, as an already constituted 
language, it can bear second order signification, like that 
found in "myth". What, then, functions as the signified? The 
signified is what lies beyond language or what is born into it 
as a presence; it is the "gaze" which is rooted in the body's 
desire.
The negation of desire and of the meanings which desire 
generate within a linguistic system is a foreclosure of that 
system, and consequently, of freedom. Such negation is always 
present in an ossified, closed, "classical" language. A 
discussion of Barthes' scientific approach to literature, of 
his "structuralist" period, follows in the next chapter. I 
will argue that this period — for which he is perhaps best 
known-- is a period in which Barthes himself denies the 
freedom of the text while trying to answer the requirements of 
responsible criticism.
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Structuralism, closure and the open text:
Sur Racine marks the most important step in the 
structuralist criticism of Roland Barthes. With this 
analysis, Barthes is at the moment of his career where he is 
the closest to other structuralist theorists, most notably 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, whose anthropological influence is 
palpable in Racine. Sur Racine is an example of
structuralism's rejection of "biographical criticism" in favor 
of an immanent reading of a work or corpus.
What distinguishes this period of Barthes' career from 
earlier and later periods? Why does Barthes later renounce 
structuralism in favor of a method which seeks only to 
identify the interplay of codes such as those presented in 
S/Z? What changes in perspective of the literary object do 
these tactical changes imply? In other words, what are the 
successes and the failures of the method which Barthes 
presents in Sur Racine? These are the questions which I shall 
answer in this chapter.
Sur Racine is divided into three parts. The first part 
presents Barthes' structural-anthropological analysis of 
"Racinian Man", which is itself composed of two parts : a
85
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general study of the structure of eleven tragedies taken 
together as a whole forming a single universe; the application 
of the findings of this study to individual analyses of each 
one of these plays. The second part of the book,, which I will 
ignore here, deals with Barthes' aesthetic analysis of various 
productions of these plays. The third section of the book, 
"Histoire ou Littérature?" {History or Literature?) presents 
Barthes’ rejection of "university criticism"— or what is also 
identified by Barthes variably as "Lansonian", positivist, 
objectivist criticism. The objectivity of such criticism, its 
reliance on historical and biographical research, as well as 
the closure of the readings which it engenders is questioned 
by Barthes. He disparagingly refers to the analyses which 
this method overproduces as "promenades littéraires" (nice 
literary strolls) in order to mark them as largely devoid of 
any social value.
The Problem:
In Barthes' view there is confusion over the ontological 
status of the literary work, and because of this the literary 
critic does not seem to know how to begin his work. The 
positivist's approach is to see the work as a product, a 
historical entity which is in some way the consequent of 
specific, identifiable causes. Positivism naturally tries to 
identify these causes in order to cast light upon the 
circumstances of their production and, therefore, to base a
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reading of the work upon the historical facts which have been
isolated and defined. The problem v/ith this, according to
Barthes, is that too often these studies only seem to be
historical studies. In fact, often they show a very weak
understanding of the historian's project. One learns from
positivist readings, for example, that such and such a play
produced such a and such an effect during its premier
presentation, but one does not learn anything about the
public, its class composition, what its disposition towards
theater was, what its affective culture was, its eduction, or
why these people would tend to go to such a spectacle as the
one under investigation. Do they attend for artistic and
literary reasons or for "snob" reasons? In other words, how
is one to interpret the fact that "the public cried"? The
problem is that too often the literary critic makes a bad
historian because he is too insensitive to sociological
questions. Barthes laments this kind of criticism, especially
when it comes to histories which he has read regarding Racine.
Everywhere, it is Racine who makes 
history appear before him, around him, it 
is not history which cites Racine ... the 
very object of the research remains 
predetermined by an abandoned structure, 
which is more and more contrary to the 
idea which the social sciences make of 
man. The consequences of this are 
weighty; by settling upon the author, by 
making his literary "genius" the very 
heart of the study, one relegates the 
truly historical objects to some far away 
nebulous zone; one touches them by 
chance, in passing; in the best of cases 
one signals their existence, leaving to 
others the task of dealing with them.
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someday; the essential aspect of literary 
history falls to pieces, abandoned both 
by the critic and the historian. {Racine, 
p. 143 [all translations mine, except 
where noted])
And further on Barthes concludes that
literary history is only possible if it 
is conducted sociologically, if it deals 
with activities and institutions and not 
individuals (146).
The critic cannot treat historical facts as direct or 
indirect confirmation of his theories regarding the causes of 
the author’s literary production. History does not stand 
outside of such events as their factual guarantor. This is 
so, because there are no simple facts which reveal their own 
truth or which can, by themselves, verify the critic's 
postulations. The critic must, at a certain level of his 
analysis, function without a guarantee {toucher un fond sans 
preuve) in treating the work and its author. Finally, he must 
separate historical from literary questions. He must risk 
something without support from "the facts" which "pour in" 
from outside of the work — facts which cannot address, in any 
case, the question pertaining to the genesis of the work. The 
full power of literary history, armed with all of its 
biographical, sociological and psychological facts, cannot 
explain the creation of the work. It cannot demonstrate 
without assumption that the work is the language product of 
these circumstances, that it is a grand allegory based upon 
the imitation of something outside of the text . What does one 
do, Barthes asks, with the other three quarters of the work
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which has managed to escape the "allegorical net"? Such a 
reading is inevitably incomplete. So why continue with the 
pretention that the work resembles something which is exterior 
to it? How does one preclude, for example, the probability 
that the work is a deformation of the reflected world which is 
exterior to it? It is, in Barthes' view, more than a little 
naive to construct direct parallels between the work and the 
life of the author: to say that Oreste is Racine and that the 
actress Du Parc is Andromaque. It is a giant and foolish 
step, then, to go further and to become dogmatic about such a 
reading. And even if it were true that there existed such a 
parallel between the life of the author and his work, the 
interest, for Barthes, would be to demonstrate "in what way it 
is deformed, denied or even suppressed; imagination is 
deformation; the poetic activity consists in undoing 
images"... {154 my translation). The author is not simply a 
mirror which reflects the light of day. He is rather a lens 
or a prism which deforms this light. (Proust's favorite image 
for the writer is that of the kaleidoscope.)
If one accepts this point, then one accepts that there is 
no literal, causal reading of the "historical facts" of the 
work, nor of the great "genius" of the author. History and 
literature are two different orders. In Barthes' view, 
history approaches the work. It can throv; light upon it. But 
it cannot give to literature its causes of production nor a 
fixed reading of its significations. It cannot because the
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literary work is not an object like other objects. The 
literary object is what Barthes calls an "institutionalized 
subjectivity" (156). In existentialist vocabulary the work is 
a "for-itself" {un pour-soi) which has no defined essence. 
What object does? Is not our realization of this fact the 
motivation behind cultural studies? In fact, the situation is 
even more complicated if one considers the work from a 
Lacanian point of view. Doubrovsky writes that since Lacan 
the Barthesian definition of literature as "institutionalized 
subjectivity" is no longer viable. There is no longer a 
subjectivity to be studied, only language.
In which case, reading a text means 
reading through or beyond a text; it 
means attempting to bring into focus, 
beyond the appearances of the written 
work, Its crue significations, which are 
those of the real world. It is in this
way, feeding on the corpse of literature
itself , that the monster of literary 
history was constituted and perpetuates 
Itself. ( The New ,Cr it icism in Fran.ce , p .
Ill)
The idea that the significations of the work are those of
the wo rid is not another new invitation to define and anchor
the work with something fixed. The world, after all, changes 
—  as does our conception of it. The relation between the
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world and the work is a relation between two processes. The 
work, like history, goes beyond the individual.
It is thus at the level of the literary 
functions (production, communication, 
consumption) alone that history can be 
placed, and not at the level of the 
individuals who have made it. In other 
words, literary history is possible only 
if it is made sociological, if it is 
interested in activities and 
institutions, and not individuals.
(Racine p . 146)
The semiological perspective of the literary object:
Literary history cannot determine a reading by 
foreclosure. It is, then, better to abandon the search for 
the causal antecedents of the literary creation. One must 
stop conceiving the work as a product, says Barthes, in favor 
of a conception of the work as a sign.
Little by little the idea of a product 
has made place for the idea of the sign.
The work would be the sign of a beyond of 
itself; criticism, then, consists in 
deciphering the signification, to 
discover its terms, and principally the 
hidden term, the signified. . . . Its
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purpose IS to open the work up, not as an
effect of a cause, but as the signifier
of a signified {Racine, p. 147-8)
The conception of the work as a sign accepts and supports
the non-motivated relation between the signified (postulated
by the critic) and the signifier (the work). Barthes
constantly protects the arbitrary nature of the sign, thereby
protecting the for-itself status of the work. This conception
of the work as sign also promotes the idea that the work
signifies v/ithout end, beyond any signified which is offered
to it. This continual signification is possible because the
relation postulated between the two terms is, and ultimately
must remain, non-motivated.
Not only is there a lack of motivation between the two
elements of the literary sign, but there is also something
arbitrary in the choice of the signified. This is very
important to Barthes' argument. One might perhaps think that
the most "objective" reading would be to identify the work
with the world (as mentioned above by Doubrovsky), by raising
the question of imitation, to say that the work is a
reflection of the real. But Barthes wonders about the worldly
choice of this signifier.
at what level of the world does one stop 
the signification? Contemporality (the 
English Restoration for Athatlie)? At 
the level of political crisis (the 
Turkish crisis of 1571 for Mithridate)?
At the level of current opinion? At the 
"vision of the world" (Goldmann)? And if 
the work signifies its author, the same
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uncertainty begins again: at what level
of his person does one fix the signified? 
a psychology of the age? an archaic style 
psyche (Mauron)? Each of these is a 
fundamental decision, determined less by 
the function of the work than by 
preconceived ideas one has of the world 
or psychology of Racine (149)
To say that the work signifies this or that is always to 
risk something. It necessitates the introduction of 
subjectivity into the analysis . . . from the beginning. It 
means risking a choice, made arbitrarily, and to treat this 
choice as motivated by the work (all the while knowing that it 
isn't completely motivated). In Saussurian linguistics we 
know that a single signifier can have many signifieds. In his 
analyses of myth Barthes shows how these signifieds need not 
eliminate each other in the course of transmitting a message, 
but how, on the contrary, one may ride another. To choose one 
of these signifieds in the domain of literature, Barthes says, 
is to "impose a stop upon the process of signification" (149). 
The proliferation of the signification is truncated. There is 
no innocent analysis of literature (151).
What this means, finally, is that the critic must accept 
the role of his subjectivity in his work. Total objectivity 
is not possible. And if it were, it wouldn't be desirable, in 
any case. Titles would become gravestones. But, as it is, 
there is no truth, no last word defining literary works. What 
the critic can bring to the work, however, is a reading wnich 
may very well treat historical values, but which nevertheless 
has its beginning in a openly claimed position vis-à-vis the
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work. What the critic aims at, according to this view, is a 
systematic coherency of his reading, not the truth. For 
Barthes, the more the literary work supports diverse readings, 
the more literature in it — for it is the very nature of the 
literary signifier to defeat a stable signified. Racine's 
work, says Barthes
lends itself to several critical 
languages: psychoanalytic, existential,
tragic, psychological (one can invent 
others and others will be invented); none 
of which is innocent. ... In order to 
follow this movement, the critic must 
announce his fatal bet which makes him 
speak Racine in one fashion and not in 
another: he also is a part or literature.
The first objective rule here is to 
announce the system by which he reads, 
with the understanding that there is no 
neutral one (156).
So Barthes does not so much mind the literary promenade 
as long as it is understood that there is more than one path 
to take through the park.
For Barthes, ever since Degré Zéro, the author is to be 
engaged, in the Sartrian sense, not only by the content of his 
work {le fond), of his writing, but also by means of the very 
form of his language, by his stance vis-à-vis the language of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
literature; his écriture. Here, Barthes announces that the 
critic is engaged as well. The critic offers the public a 
inter-lingual text. And he must announce the reason for which 
he wishes to speak of this chosen work. He must justify his 
activity. It is only normal, after all, that the critic tells 
us what it is about his reading which has social pertinence. 
And by doing this he brings us to a new consciousness of the 
social value of the literary work itself.
The "system of reading" about which Barthes spoke above 
responds to the exigency of the critic's social responsibility 
as well. Barthes' view here is that any critical perspective 
is itself systematically ordered, having its deferred center 
(Derrida), and thus open to question. Any systematic reading 
provides a deformation of the work, but it is at least a 
systematic deformation. The question pertaining to whether or 
not this perspective should be chosen over another is in the 
hands of the critic alone. He is free to choose his critical 
language. It will, no doubt, be partly determined by the work 
to be investigated, since the single most important 
requirement to be satisfied is that of coherency. The reading 
must take into account, even in its distorted way, the whole 
of the work.
Since all readings which begin with that which is 
exterior to the work in order to demonstrate the work's 
determined status are problematic, Barthes eschews all 
consideration of this exteriority. This is the radical step
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of the structuralist. When he constructs the sign of the 
literary work he refuses all motivation which seeks to 
determine the choice of its signified. To give a fixed
signified is to refuse the subjectivity, the for-itself of the 
work. According to Barthes, there is no Racine "in-himself" 
{en-soi). Or as Wasiolek notes wryly, employing the 
simplistic positivist view of language, in the introduction to 
The New Criticism in France, the en-soi of Racine is forever 
plural.
One may explain Barthes' position by 
saying that it is a radical 
identification of sign and referent, for 
the referent is as many things as there 
are ways of "writing" about the sign
(9) ^
This radicality of the structuralist position pushes 
Barthes so far as to accept all forms of literary criticism of 
Racine as having some value — even what for him amounts to 
"bad" criticism. He writes that, in fact, he admires them all 
(157). Each one adds a different value to Racine's work. And 
because the "essence" of the work is always an absence, which 
cannot be filled except by the reader or the critic in a 
contingent manner, every different analysis speaks of the 
value, the plurality, the différance of the text.
The important distinction between traditional criticism 
and that of Barthes is that Barthes wants to read the work
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immanently. He wants to remain within the text as much as 
possible, but enveloped, as it were, within a social discourse 
which he avows. The second language of the critic is 
extremely important, having, as it does, considerable 
orientational power. This implies, it goes almost goes 
without saying, that the critic must master at least one, and 
preferably several, of these social discourses. The immanence 
which Barthes envisions is thus qualified by the second 
language employed in the critical activity, the language of 
the critic.
Barthes solution to reading Racine: the simulacrum:
One language is needed in order to analyze another. 
This, at any rate, is the position taken by Barthes at this 
point in his career. A convergence of languages is what 
distinguishes a critical from a non-critical reading of the 
text. Barthes speaks of these two possible modes of reading 
in Critique et Vérité (Criticism and Truth). The non-cr itical 
reader is he who loves the text, he who refuses to "double the 
word of the text with any other word" (93). The critic, on 
the other hand "doubles" the work by translating it into 
another language.
In order to have the right to defend an 
immanent reading of a work, one has to 
know logic, history, psychoanalysis. In 
short to return the work to literature.
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one has precisely to leave it and to 
appeal to an anthropological culture 
(93).
This anthropological culture is precisely what Barthes 
brings to his reading of Racine; a discourse of man. 
"Racinian Man" is but the structuring of man which he finds in 
the work of Racine, not the biographical traits of Racine, the 
man. What exactly is Barthes' enterprise? What is the 
structure of this structuration which doubles the text? What 
consequences does Barthes' method have for the liberty of the 
signifier?
Barthes describes the doubling process in an essay 
published the same year as Sur Racine, (1963 ). In the article 
"L'Activité Structuraliste" (Essais Critiques, pp. 213-221). 
Barthes presents the model for his analysis contained in Sur 
Racine. According to Barthes, the structural analysis tries 
to reconstruct an intelligible object which comprises the 
"structural units" of a text and which brings out the 
functional relations between these units.
The structure is thus, in fact, a 
simulacrum of the object but a directed 
and interested simulacrum, since the 
imitated object makes something appear 
which had been invisible, or if one 
prefers, unintelligible in the natural 
object. (Essais Critiques, p. 214)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
The simulacrum is not an ideal reproduction of the 
object, but rather a functional reproduction of the original 
which it illuminates. Since the internal relations of the 
object (the text) are enhanced by a second language, by the 
critic's approach, they are thus "oriented" and "interested". 
The work is necessarily deformed by the critical language 
which is involved in choosing units. But this deformation is 
foreseeable and controlled.
The simulacrum is not the original object but its double 
—  condensed and reduced to relational functions. However, it 
is an object which is more "intelligible" than the original. 
Barthes suggests that the interest of such an approach is that 
between the original and the simulacrum a new meaning is 
produced which belongs to the work. According to this 
perspective the work is historically marked by the creation of 
this simulacrum. The copy has added anthropological value to 
the original (Essais, p. 215).
This method is based upon an imitation --but not the same 
imitation put forth by the positivist. The structuralist has 
not postulated a relation of imitation between the work and 
the world. Rather, he has posited a relation between the work 
and a functional copy which reveals the "grammatical" 
relations of its units. As an activity, structuralism is 
content to remain within this copy, within the work. It 
accepts the relations which govern the simulacrum as the 
limits of its activity.
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Barthes' simulacrum is created by two separate movements: 
cutting {découpage) and arranging {agencement). The two 
operations must follow certain rules. Cutting isolates the 
units of the object. (It must be remembered that here, the 
object is a group of Racine’s plays. I will return to this 
point below.) By employing the linguist's heuristic concept 
of "commutation" Barthes proposes the identification of units 
by their systematic co-dependance determined by the linguist's 
test of "commutation". This becomes a question of the level 
at which one is operating. One is at the level of fundamental 
units when the least manipulation of the unit in question 
engenders a change in the totality of units (the work). These 
units lack meaning in themselves, but they have structural 
value. They show the relations and the functions which 
comprise the totality of the object. The units form classes 
based upon their formal resemblance, where each unit is 
distinguished by its difference within a class.
The assembly of the simulacrum proceeds by a study of the 
relations between the classes of units, and especially by 
determining the rules of their association. The structuralist 
must work to maintain the idea that all relations identified 
are functional relations and not the result of chance. This 
effort pays off later in terms of analytical coherency. The 
regularity of the combinations reveals the forms of relations 
which give the structure to the simulacrum. Thus, Barthes 
says, that which is constructed is not an idealized object,
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nor its essence, but a functional copy.
Finally the simulacrum must be interpreted by the
critical discourse which helped to create it. Let us look at
the application of this method in Sur Racin e . Throughout the
eleven tragedies Barthes isolates the invariable elements of
a Racinian synchrony. In the first part of the book, "The
Structure", Barthes describes his simulacrum translated by
psychoanalytic language.
Let us make of the eleven tragedies one 
essential tragedy. Let us dispose of
that tribe of fifty or so tragic 
characters which inhabit racinian tragedy 
into a kind of exemplary constellation, 
and let us find there the actions and 
figures of the primitive horde: the
father, unconditional owner of the lives 
of his sons (Amurat, Mithridate, 
Agamemmnon, Thésée, Mardochée, Joad, even 
Agrippine) and the women, at one and the 
same time mothers, sisters and lovers who 
are always coveted but rarely obtained 
(Andromaque, Junie, Atalide, Monime); 
the brothers, always enemies because they 
contest between themselves the
inheritance of the father who is not 
quite dead and who comes back to punish 
them (Etéocle and Polynice, Néron and 
Britannicus, Pharnace and Xipharès); 
finally the son, torn to death between 
his terror of his father and his need to 
destroy him (Pyrrhus, Néron, Titus,
Pharnace, Athalie). Incest, fraternal
rivalry, murder of the father, the
subversion of the son, these are the 
fundamental actions of Racinian theater.
(14-15 ) .
Barthes avoids giving these elements of the essential 
tragedy an intrinsic value. All value is determined by 
function. Thus the "three tragic spaces" have different 
functions in Racine's plays. The bedroom is always
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the invisible and fearful place where 
Power lurks: This room is at the same
time the residence of Power and its 
essence, because Power's secret is 
singular: its form exhausts its function: 
it kills in order to remain invisible
(1 0 ) .
In this way the function of the antechamber is described. 
It is where the tragic figures are made to wait and, by their 
inactivity, made to speak. The chamber door functions as "the 
temptation of the hunted to approach the hunter" (11). The 
exterior, the third Racinian space, is just the other side of 
the antechamber. This is where all real events take place. 
This is the non-tragic space which represents the possibility 
of escape.
In this way Barthes describes the functions of the 
relations between the terms of Racine's tragedies. "The flaw" 
for example, is characterized by the relation between the hero 
and all that is past. "God, blood, the father, the law, in 
short anteriority becomes an accusing essence (49).
To summarize, one sees that behind the eleven plays 
Barthes has created an object, his simulacrum which functions 
as a langue of which the individual plays are the paroles. 
(This is exactly the perspective which Barthes develops in his 
"Introduction to the Structural analysis of Narratives".) 
Each parole is distilled from the work of Racine. And this
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object, translated and interpreted by the psychoanalytic 
language in "Racinian man" serves equally as langue for the 
paroles in the second part of the book, where Barthes analyses 
each play, one by one. Barthes moves from structural 
anthropology to the psychoanalysis of texts.
Some problems with the solution:
The langue/parole relation of the simulacrum to the 
critics work gives Barthes the cohesion which he is looking 
for. This cohesion is borrowed from the object itself. The 
relations belonging to the object function as a grammar. One 
cannot say just anything. Still, the language of analysis has 
its own forms — its relations and functions which must be 
respected. That which is "new", the critical perspective, is 
produced at the intersection of these two languages. It 
cannot be anything other than what is sanctioned by them. 
Here, then, is the vision of an analysis which is a productive 
moment at the confluence of two languages: that of the author 
and that of the social discourse which serves as the tool of 
the critic.
But, what are the vital signs of the simulacrum 
constituted in this way? Is the work, treated in this way, 
still alive? How does one keep from thinking that the 
simulacrum gives stillbirth to signifieds which close the 
reading of the plays? In other words, as soon as a coherent 
but nonetheless unitary signified is connected with the
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literary signifier, hasn’t one limited the work’s 
signification? Doesn't any single reading of a work produce 
this closure? Finally, doesn't this critical activity find 
its death as well as its birth in the confluence of these two 
languages? How does one avoid the idea that the critic has 
stopped the signification of the text?
In Vertige du Déplacement Stephen Heath speaks of the
problems which Barthes must have later perceived with this
approach. Heath suggest that the idea of langue behind the
narrative unavoidably functions as a norm against which each
work is inevitably measured {Vertige, 84). This kind of
analysis encourages a closure of the text, even if it has its
sole object the search for its structure. (It is clear that
Barthes has not yet arrived at Kristeva’s phenotext/geno text
opposition which informs S/Z ) . Such an analysis still has the
tendency to close the productivity of the text's literary
language --a closure which Barthes is trying to fight with his
definition of the text as a pour-soi. Heath writes
Thus the analysis distances itself from 
anything resembling interpretation or 
explication of a single text; it has only 
a general ambition, to (re-)constitute a 
common language for all the narratives,
and as a consequence one needs a corpus ;
the method can only work with several 
narratives (and not with one only) united 
in the quest of determining a single 
structure, the individual narrative 
being, thus considered as a message, a 
parole which reflects the general 
structure. ... In effect, the analysis 
of the narrative is defined as an 
analysis of the signified, or of the 
content, if one wants to admit that there
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is a form of the content, which is the 
very field of analysis. ... fVerti_ge,
84, my translation)
The simulacrum is not a genetic element of language. One 
way or another the generativity associated with language 
structure escapes the simulacrum. The simulacrum identified 
by Barthes in the depths of Racine's eleven tragedies is not 
the "deep structure" of Chomskian linguistics. It does not 
generate an infinite number of propositions. Rather, it 
functions as a great over-arching signified — the result of a 
reduction of a corpus towards an average. Or, if it contains 
within itself the generative possibility of langue, the living 
aspect of the simulacrum is smothered by the admixture of a 
second (critical) language. That which hampers Barthes' 
analysis is the apparent loss of the contingent relation 
between signifier and signified. The criticism is motivated 
by the simulacrum. The question thus becomes how to conserve 
the contingency of this relation while at the same time 
producing an analysis which is not fortuitous. W i t h o u t  
daring to treat these problems at this time, I would simply 
like to remark that here, as elsewhere, Barthes suffers from 
too much "scientific" success. Because of his debate with 
Raymond Picard he is no doubt looking for a defensible reading 
of a text, but he has produced more than that. He develops a 
"scientifically" restricted signifier which is not a literary 
signifier. It is not polysemous. It is then interpreted by 
a critical language, itself suited to communication, which
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produces a signified. Barthes finds a signified, but only 
after having frozen the work in the functional relations of
his simulacrum. Is this really what he wants to be doing? My
personal feeling is that he is looking for something else, 
even while he is going through this rigorous process which, 
unarguably produces good criticism.
In Sur Racine there are traces of Barthes' earlier 
studies which indicate that he is still haunted by the 
question of the author's "mythological" sources of écriture,
first addressed in Degré Zéro. This source, we have seen, is
what determines the style of an author's écriture. This style 
is the impregnation of an individual’s sub-language {sous- 
langage) into the literary language of the times. This dense 
sub-language is the individual's primal affective energy which 
orders and establishes his relation to the world. Style is 
that language of the individual's most profound depths which 
"speaks" through the metaphors and metonymies of his figure. 
It is this language which, in its early form of écriture, 
(before écriture is established as a "mode), accounts for the 
unreadability (illisibilité) factor of the text which 
interests Barthes so much, some twenty years later in S/Z.
Perhaps it is not surprising that Barthes' concern for 
sources of écriture returns in his study of Racine's classical 
writing. Ecriture is more than a category of the literary. 
It represents more than this. It affirms the evocative power 
of language, and language's ability to escape, undo.
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deconstruct structures which are built upon it. And at the 
personal level, it ultimately mitigates the structuring force 
of language upon subjectivity.
Barthes reminds his reader of the formal constraints 
imposed upon the classical writer. Racine must use a language 
which has been purged of novelty and has already been highly 
codified. He argues that Racine so skillfully masters these 
constraints as to effectively neutralize their suppression of 
his sub-language. The clarity of his literary language 
exposes his sub-language (59). Barthes makes an interesting 
case for his argument. He says that Racine's is an example of 
writing which was destined to be cited. He says that it is a 
language which makes reference to itself — though he doesn't 
explain this remark. This tautological state of writing is 
laudable in Racine's case, Barthes says, because the classical 
mode which is imposed upon the author becomes a form devoid of 
all substance. This statement is to be understood as 
referring to the "clarifying" of stylistic "residues" 
discussed in chapter two. Racine's clarity is a complete 
mastery of literary language to the point that one hears in it 
something profoundly personal. Racine is ultimately
indifferent to the language imposed upon him.
This explains Racine's success: his
poetic écriture was sufficiently 
transparent so as to allow the "fish­
like" character of the scene to be
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perceived: the articulatory substratum is 
so near that it gives a kind of supple 
breath to Racinian discourse, a 
relaxation, and I would say, almost a 
"swing" (59).
Barthes is, in fact, still working on his Micheletian 
project to understand the style (as language) of an author.
(Michelet, it is often noted, was the favorite of his books.) 
This is all the more supported by his concern for the "fish­
like" character of Racinian theater. Once again, he doesn’t 
explain what he means. This strange concern is a direct hold­
over from his biographical study of Michelet. Michelet was 
fascinated by the sea, felt a part of it, and viewed history 
in aquatic terms (Michelet 39).
The "swing" which characterizes Racine is precisely, in 
my view, what Barthes is looking for. He would desperately 
like to locate his free signifiers there. It is the author's 
"secret flesh" {Degree Zero p. 13) that interests Barthes — a 
flesh which he later studies under the guise of music ("Le 
Grain de la Voix"). But he doesn't dare continue directly 
with this biographical study. His belief in the "engaged" 
activity of the critic, his need to produce "responsible" 
criticism, together with structuralism's immanent reading, all 
lead him to the simulacrum which, unfortunately for Barthes, 
fails to produce this "swing".
Barthes ' basic ontological view of the text holds that it
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IS structured and infinite. But his analysis in Racine fails 
to capture this living aspect of the plays. (How can they be 
captured in a signified?) Later in Essais Critiques Barthes 
reaffirms this conception of the work as "open" and announces 
for the first time that the critic never has the last word to 
say regarding a literary work (9). For him the critic who 
stops the works signification, who fails to touch the author's 
sub-language, is at fault. This is a change of position from 
that found at the end of Racine. From Racine on, Barthes 
rejects all signifieds offered to a text. He looks for the 
possibility of a criticism as alive as the work itself: an
approach, a critical language which does not close the text 
off from its signification. To give an orientation of such a 
criticism, I will point to the direction which led Barthes to
In Critique et Vérité, Barthes next major work after 
Racine, Barthes puts science at the service of the "plurality" 
of the text and not at the service of the intelligible 
reconstruction of its structure. This marks the end for the 
simulacrum as a tool. Barthes is no longer in the business of 
ascribing signifieds, even plural ones, to the signifiers of 
the text.
As soon as one is prepared to allow (and 
to draw the consequences of the fact) 
that the work is made from writing, a
certain kind of literary science is
possible. If this science should come
into existence one day, its object could
not be to impose a meaning on the work, 
in the name of which it would arrogate to
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itself the right to reject other 
meanings: ... It cannot be a science of
^the content of works ... but a science of 
'the conditions of content, that is to say 
of forms; ... it will not interpret
symbols, but only their polyvalence. In 
a word, its object will no longer be the 
full meaning of the work but on the 
contrary the empty meaning which 
underpins them all {Critique et Vérité, 
pp. 73-74, trans. Paul DeMan).
It is this science of literature which is explored in S/Z
where all that remains of structuralism is a concern for the
codes through which the reader receives and reconstructs the 
text. These codes belong to the "structuration" of the text, 
not its structure. And, to the extent that the codes are
shared by author and reader, they determine the "readability" 
or "writability" of the work. This very interesting 
distinction displaces Barthes' concern for "good" versus "bad" 
literature. From S/Z forward Barthes' measure of literature 
is the pleasure he associates with polysemy. In Kristevan 
terms, he abandons the "pheno-text," the given text, for the 
"geno-text" which is the text that is open to many genetically 
related readings.
Barthes abandons his scientific dream, of which the 
method described above was to be the foundation. In "The 
Structural Analysis of Narratives" he spoke of gathering 
together and comparing the structures (simulacra) of all 
narrative forms to study their differences and how these 
differences generate meaning. But because he realized that 
this method tends to equalize texts, he abandoned it. In its
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place came the study of différence at the level of the single 
text. Barthes asks himself how a text can be different. From 
what? From itself. SJ_Z is criticism of the realist text 
through rereading. We must reread in order to access the 
différence of a "realist" work, because if we do not, Barthes 
asserts, we simply read the same text everywhere (S/1, p. 10). 
Rereading opens the text's original closure.
Rereading is to "write" the work, to become aware of the 
full suggestivity of the work as text. It is to bathe in the 
text's connotationality.
Denotation is not the first meaning, but 
pretends to be so; under this illusion it 
is ultimately no more than the last of 
the connotations ( the one which seems 
both to establish and close the reading)
{SJJZ p. 9)
Barthes' new critical activity aims at reconstructing 
différences the re-establishment of connotation without the 
presence of denotation. In narration this re-reading presents 
the reader with "residues of unresolved meaning at the level 
of the plural of the text", "semantic noise" (41).
Barthes shows us that the realist novel Sarrasine is, in 
fact a "limit text". It is not just "realist" in that its 
connotations are coded into denotation of "the real", but, as 
George Wasserman points out, Sarrasine dramatizes the 
assumptions upon which this mechanism is based. It points to
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them. Sarrasine is the story about telling a story. The 
story teller agrees to tell his story to a young woman in 
exchange for spending a night with her. He reveals the secret 
of an old man at the party, a castrate who sang by the name 
Zambinella in his youth and was loved by a sculptor, 
Sarrasine, who did not recognize the first's transvestitism. 
{S)he responds to the sculptor's declarations of love with 
"And if I were not a woman?". Sarrasine eventually learns the 
truth and tries to kill Zambinella when he finds out. The 
man's story ends; the woman, horrified, reneges on her deal. 
Sarrasine, Wasserman concludes, reveals the fallacy of 
realism. "The Realist impulse to go beyond appearances, to 
accept the code of representation as reality leads to 
failure" (Roland Barthes p. 8 6 ).
Without the closure which comes from an ideologically 
unified first reading, rereading places the reader in the 
presence of the novelistic without the novel, the poetic 
without poetry, structuration without structure, the 
production without product, writing without the written ( S/Z 
p. 5). The writerly text, Barthes explains, is not a thing 
but "play" in language in textual form. It is the zero degree 
of écriture. It is for this reason that Barthes says of the 
writerly text that it is the least "written". It is the most 
"playful".
Barthes totally renounces, then, any effort to give a 
meaning to the text. In its place, he characterizes works by
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their readability. Later, in The Pleasure of the Text, he 
associates the readability factor either with pleasure 
("readerly" text) or with Jouissance ("writerly" text). Thus 
Barthes is no longer concerned with a method which unifies the 
reading of the signs of literature; he speaks rather of the 
generative aspect of the codes which produces these signs and 
their reading. And he invites other readers to find other 
codes. His reading of Sarrasine is not governed by the same 
principle of découpage seen at work in Racine. The work is 
cut, but according to Barthes' perception of the working of 
the codes. In fact, he does not wish to cut at all. He 
"traces" the length of the work's diverse "textures". The 
work has become "text" a fabric, or perhaps a living tissue in 
that it borrows the body of its reader. It is unique. 
Barthes no longer speaks of an ensemble of texts, but rather 
of the resonances of intertextuality. This intertextuality is 
a function of the cultural working of the codes. The text and 
its reader share the textuality produced phenomenologically in 
the act of reading. They share the same "structuration" in 
the process of social signification. Text and reader are both 
written. What remains — the unwritten—  is left to the body.
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END NOTES
1. Wasiolek's statement is well taken. However, if one 
continues to speak in this way, one runs the risk of confusing 
the signified with the referent, which is objective and 
outside of the sign. Barthes is rarely interested in the
referent, which, in any case always lends itself to an 
interpretation, that is to say, it always leads itself back to 
the sign.
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Chapter 5
The body within the sign
In an author’s lexicon, will there not always 
be a word-as-mana? . . . This word has 
gradually appeared in his work; at first it 
was masked by the instance of Truth (that of 
systems and structures); now it blossoms, it 
flourishes; this word-as mana is the word 
"body” {Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, p.
133 )
The word-as-mana is the word which serves as a key to all of 
Barthes' theory. It is his deferred, floating signifier. Barthes 
wants to bring us back to a biological model of the subject, to 
involve something other than "personality", the "mind", the "ego" 
in the processes of agency and signification. The body is this 
something other. In Barthes' theory it serves as the individual's 
physical access not just to the world, but to all "meaning" --the 
profound meaning belonging to the subject; meaning for me.
The experience of such meaning is intermittent in a 
linguistically pre-ordained world of experience. It is the 
experience of the unexpressed word, the sliding of signigfiers or, 
as we have seen in the case of poetry, the emerging presence of the 
referent in language. But, this experience, rare though it may be, 
is important as a reminder of the possibility of écriture. This 
occasional resurfacing testifies to the presence of the erotic body 
in signification which exclaims joyfully: "That's it! And what's
more: that's it for me! ... " (The Pleasure of the. Text., p. 13).
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The body has special status in Barthes’ theory: it is the only 
reality which he can claim as truly belonging to the individual. 
It is involved in the production and reception of meaning. It is 
the origin of meaning for the individual, its point of conception, 
its emission and reception, the flesh upon which meaning is traced. 
In other words, the body is what serves as the locus point for 
whatever subjectivity is left over after the social writing of the 
subject. The body is what escapes this normative writing of 
socialized subject.
Haunted by his mistrust for languages and the ideologies they 
hide, Barthes tries to liberate a single word of all signification 
in order to use it as needed. He wants a word which incarnates 
écriture, a word which evokes a substance, an agency outside of all 
previous system, a word which, when functioning within a system, is 
deployed in so figurative a manner as not to be pinned down to any 
stable meaning.
With the concept of the body having no determinate 
signification elsewhere in Barthes' theory, and having generally 
been ascribed no agency in Western Philosophy in general, a 
signifier has been found to which the reader cannot provide a ready 
signified. It is not easy to delimit the body in Barthes' theory. 
The body functions both figuratively and normatively within his 
language — because, like the "gaze" of Degree zero, it is not
wholly a part of language.
The body is outside of all ideological structure. It has been 
displaced from moral and political argumentation. Barthes is happy
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to employ the body, then, because he wants the reader to receive 
the "letter" of his message at the most personal level of meaning. 
His "lover" in Fragments d'un discours amoureux provides an 
example :
That which resonates in me, is what I learn 
with my body ... the word, the image, the 
thought acts like the striking of a whip. The 
interior of my body starts to vibrate, as if 
shaken by trumpets which call and respond to 
each other {FDA 237, cited in Burgwinkle [my 
translation]).
The body, as we have seen, is the locus of great writing, of 
new and figurative language, of écriture. The body is also in some 
sense, the reservoir for residual meaning, felt but not made 
explicit in communication. S/Z introduced the "writerly text" 
along with the idea of the "written" subject into Barthes' 
theoretical framework. The textual residue which remains in any 
communication process demonstrates the "play" in the language which 
encourages the play of the body in structuring its own meanings.
In Barthes' loosely autobiographic Roland Barthes par Roland
Barthes . he affirms the unique character of each body and its role 
it producing, in gestalt fashion, personal signs. "The body is the 
irreducible difference, and at the same time, the principle of 
every structuration" {BB, p. 177). The body, then, serves as the 
minimal systemic environment within which signs signify in which 
they find their positive value. (See chapter 1 for discussion of
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positive and negative value of signs). Barthes seems unwilling to 
"capture" this play by providing examples of individually motivated 
and differentiated signifieds, yet, curiously, he is irresistibly 
drawn to the idea of explaining the workings of the role of the 
body in the creation ( writing/reading) of meaning. In Le Grain de 
la Voix, Barthes reaffirms the idea that not all meaning is caught 
up by the "braiding" of the codes in a text, and that the body is 
still at the center of his concerns:
Writing begins with style, which is not the 
same thing as writing well : it refers to, as I 
said already in Writing Degree Zero, to the 
depth of the body, and cannot be reduced to a 
nice little aesthetic intention ... Even from 
simply the tactical viewpoint, one must accept 
to get beyond style, on the one hand and 
something which would be more serious, which 
is to be in the signifier, which is to say in 
the style, since it is there that écriture 
begins. (GLV, p. 19, my translation, emphasis 
added. )
Barthes would like to understand the functioning and the logic 
of the "unconscious" of the signifier. Yet it is clear that he 
doesn't want to reduce this function to a psychoanalysis of the 
body's figures. Such an analysis could only once again produce an 
artificial closure because, as far as Barthes is concerned, reason 
and the bod” have two different languages:
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The pleasure of the text is that moment when 
my body pursues its own ideas —  for my body 
does not have the same ideas I do (The 
Pleasure of the text p. 17)
Clearly there are two languages at work in the Barthesian 
subject: that of the social subject constituted in "social"
language, and that of the body. Jonathan Culler notes that Barthes
refuses the cartesian conception of the subject as master of 
language, but that he leaves himself open to criticism by placing 
a natural "essence" within the body (Roland Barthes, p. 97).
Barthes, he argues, contradicts himself by running back to "nature" 
after he has denied its workings in naturalizing process of 
ideology in language (myth). Does Barthes want to give a
naturalist explanation of "writing" with the body as transcendental 
agent? It seems to me that the answer is clearly in the negative. 
Style/body is not a language which underwrites conscious language 
sign by sign. It is not a transcendental agency. It is rather a 
language which helps to establish a focal point, a desire, a 
deferred signified around which conscious language organizes 
itself. All it can offer, by way of communication with conscious 
language is what one might call "correction". Barthes describes 
his own writing in the following way:
The discourse which first comes to him is 
banal, and it is only by struggling against 
this original banality that, little by little 
he writes... (banality is discourse without
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the body). In sum, what he writes proceeds 
from a corrected banality. {BB, p. 141, my 
translation).
The body is the individual's signifying essence, not a subjectivity 
but a grounding for subjectivity. Leslie Hill describes the body 
as a founding act, an original difference, an energy or potential 
(Paragraph, Vol. 2, 1988, p.108). In this respect I disagree with 
Burgwinkle who sees in the body an "identity which is absolutely 
corporal" ("Le Corps Barthesian," in Constructions. 1985, p. 87). 
An absolutely corporal identity could have no language at all. The 
body is phenomenologically caught up in consciousness, in 
representation, in the production and decoding of signification, 
wherever the denotative process is shaken, wherever ready made 
meaning is troubled. It surges up between the gaps between 
language and desire.
With the figure of the body, Barthes is once again refusing 
definition and closure. If a literary critic says Racine's works 
mean one thing based upon a close psychoanalytic reading, Barthes 
will argue that it means that and more. Reading will always point 
to this "more". If Lacan says that the subject is written, Barthes 
accepts, but with the caveat that there is something grounding the 
production and reception of language which is uniquely individual, 
and not properly a product of the language system.
The body and ethos :
Barthes concludes his Barthes by Barthes with the enigmatic
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phrase "to write the body" [écrire le corps] which in the French is 
somewhat ambiguous since it is either a command or a (utopie) wish. 
In either case it represents Barthes' fundamental desire: to give 
language to the body (and body to language), thereby affirming the 
liberation of language itself.
Burgwinkle points out that Barthes never claimed that writing 
the body was more natural or more simple than following the 
established modes of writing which deny the individual his/her 
body. To write the body requires a struggle against one's own 
language. It is a challenge in which the writer is thrown against 
society, against ideology, and against the very language which 
betrays his desire even through its apparent clarity. Barthes 
notes that it is precisely when we experience intense pleasure that 
the socially constructed self is problematized:
Whenever I attempt to "analyze" a text which 
has given me pleasure, it is not my 
"subjectivity" I encounter but my 
"individuality," ... my body of blis.s ... my 
historical subject. It is at the conclusion 
... of a contradictory interplay of (cultural) 
pleasure and (non-cultural) bliss, .. that I 
write myself as a subject at present out of 
place: anachronic subject, adrift. {PT 52,
63 ) .
gĝ -r]̂ 0 g 2 s not a writer who falls back on hj.maelf and his own 
sensations after having been disappointed by the failure of his
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politic3l idsâls. On ths contir3iry, B3rthss compsrss ths jouisssncs 
of the writer end re3der to 3  destructive force which demolishes 
the complscency of pleesure, snd consequently, of society.
This view of the politicsl neture of jouissancs is smplified 
by Leslie Hill, who srgues th3t Berthes' conception of the kinds of 
textuel pleesures is inherited from Brecht's critique of "culinsry 
thester" produced by the "neturelistic stege". Brecht, Hill notes, 
envisioned e criticelly elert thester to which spectetors would 
come not es pessive consumers but es ective perticipents. Berthes 
sees treditionsl theeter es "nercotic" beceuse it is "essocieted 
with the repugnent neturel order of the self evident" (Pereqreph, 
Vol. 2, 1988, p. 116). Hill goes on to note thet, egeinst this
theeter Berthes sets up e theeter identified with the ect of 
writing, with the open end plurel text. This theeter "performs 
ecross the surfsee of the body, ecross other texts end writings, in 
a ceaseless movement of detachment end differentiation" (117). 
Again, these distinctions ere based upon Berthes' ever present 
concern with écriture. Unlike traditional theeter, Brechtian 
theater problematizes language by placing theater itself within 
crisis. Brecht "activates" theater by refusing to "freeze" history 
in representation and by not allowing his audience to slip into 
passivity. Disruptive pleasure is political. Brecht uses pleasure 
to disrupt ideological narcosis, to trouble closure by perverting
the denotative processes.
Hill argues that the body in Barthes must be understood as 
pining towards the same end: "the act of saying is more charged
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politically than what is said, and that history itself is more a 
history of ways of signifying than of things signified" (117).
The body is a rejection of stereotype as well. Barthes, as we 
noted in the chapter on poetry, finds certain repetition fruitful - 
-as in the case where everyday language produces a void which is 
suggestive of a presence. Doxa, on the other hand reveals the 
presence of ideological stereotype. Barthes uses the body to
distinguish the two:
A repetition which comes from the body is
good. Doxa is an unworthy object because it 
is a dead repetition which does not come from 
anyone's body— unless, maybe precisely, from 
the bodies of the dead. (Bathes by Barthes, p.
75)
As for stereotype, it is
the positioning of the discourse where the 
body is missing, there where one is certain it 
is not. Inversely, in this seemingly
collective text which I am in the process of 
reading, sometimes the stereotype 
{!'écrlvance) ceases and écriture appears; I 
am now sure that this morsel of signified was 
produced by a body. (BB, 93)
For the reader, écriture represents the real body of the other in
writing. It is profoundly meaningful language because it carries
a bodily substance caught up in signification. It is a refusal of
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the readymade. To refuse stereotype, as Barthes demonstrated in 
Mythologies, is to refuse the most important myths of a society. 
But, it is also to enjoy what one might term the "maternal capital" 
held in reserve within a language. Again, Barthes’ eudemonism is 
clearly political:
I would go so far as to take bliss in a 
disfiguration of the language, and opinion 
will strenuously object, since it opposes 
"disfiguring nature" {PT, p. 37).
It may be misleading to hear Barthes speak of "disfiguring" 
language — forever the love object of his theorizing. What Barthes 
is disfiguring, is not so much language, which in its healthy state 
is flexible and admits "play", but the complacency of second order 
language systems which have been allowed to pass themselves off as 
"natural". As always, what Barthes objects to is the "masculine" 
force in language: ideology, system, law, the Father (Lacan) — all 
which cuts the individual off from the pleasure of the "maternal" 
in language. Barthes seeks love in language — love of mother, love 
of the other:
the writer is someone who plays with the body 
of his mother .. in order to glorify it, 
embellish it, or to cut it up, carry it to the 
limit of that which, of the body, can be 
recognized. (PT, 60)
Moreover, the "Other" is needed in order to recognize one’s own 
phantasmatic body. The writer and the reader share a virtual body
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within the text:
. . . my body is the prison of my Imaginary.
Your body, the thing which seems the most real 
to you, is without a doubt the most 
phantasmatic. The other is needed to liberate 
the body... This other may be an object.
{GLV, 339, cited in Burgwinkle. My
translation).
To conclude, the body is a textual adventure. It is a voyage, 
a discovery within language, an expansion of it. It is the
experience of écriture as a liberating activity. The body is the
site of pleasure, the deconstruction of social constraints within 
language, a perversion of the subject which language produces. It 
is a tool which serves the writer and the reader in the pursuit of 
the fluid signifiers within language. It produces these
signifiers, and destabilizes others. It breaks signs apart but 
provides the possibility for an new inscription. The body creates 
the absolutely unique within language. It affirms the unique non­
self. Because such an affirmation is also a destruction, it is 
inherently political.
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